Vaidik, J.
Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(d) provides that a probationer facing a petition to revoke “may not be held in jail for more than fifteen (15) days without a hearing on the alleged violation of probation.” Here, Rick Lane Utley was arrested on September 2 for allegedly violating probation. A hearing was held on September 17. Utley argues September 2 should be counted as the first day he was in jail, September 16 should be counted as the fifteenth day, and therefore he was in jail for over fifteen days before the hearing was held, in violation of Section 35-38-2-3(d). However, we find the fifteen-day time frame does not include the day of his arrest, so his hearing occurred on the fifteenth day in conformance with the statute. We affirm the trial court in this and all other respects.
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Utley’s argument requires us to address, for the first time, the means of counting days under Section 35-38-2- 3(d), which provides, (d) Except as provided in subsection (e), the court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation. The court may admit the person to bail pending the hearing. A person who is not admitted to bail pending the hearing may not be held in jail for more than fifteen (15) days without a hearing on the alleged violation of probation.
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Utley was arrested on September 2 and held until September 17 without bond or a hearing. He contends this, when including his September 2 arrest date, amounted to sixteen days in violation of Section 35-38-2-3(d). In so arguing, Utley uses the method of computation that determines credit time, although he offers no support for why this method should be used here. Because credit-time computation includes the date of arrest, this method would include his September 2 arrest date and total sixteen days. See French v. State, 754 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Credit is calculated from the date of arrest to the date of sentencing for that same offense.”).
While Utley argues his arrest date should be included in the computation, the State argues we should exclude Utley’s arrest date, citing Dobeski v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In Dobeski, the statute at issue required a defendant to register as a sex offender “not more than seven (7) days” after his release from a penal facility. Id. at 1261 (citing Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(g)). This Court was asked to determine how this time should be computed. We held the proper method for computing “days” was laid out in Trial Rule 6(A), which provides in part, “In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.” We noted Trial Rule 6(A) gives the “general rule in Indiana that when computing the time for performance of an act which must take place within a certain number of days of some triggering event, the day of the triggering event is not included.” Dobeski, 64 N.E.3d at 1261; see also Ward v. Ind. Parole Bd., 805 N.E.2d 893, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing statute requiring parole revocation hearing within sixty days of extradition and holding the “clock did not begin to run until the day after [defendant’s] extradition”), trans. denied. Accordingly, we held the day of the “triggering event”—there the day of the defendant’s release from a penal facility—was not included in the statutory time frame.
The same can be said here. Section 35-38-2-3(d)’s language is similar to the statute in Dobeski—requiring an event occur “not . . . more than” a certain number of days after a triggering event. And the statute does not indicate a method of computation. As such, we see no reason—nor does Utley offer one—to depart from the method laid out in Trial Rule 6(A) and Dobeski. This means the day of the “triggering event”—Utley’s arrest—is not included in the fifteen-day time frame, which began on September 3. The September 17 hearing was held on the fifteenth day and within the statutory time frame.
The trial court did not violate Utley’s statutory right to have a hearing no more than fifteen days after his arrest.
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Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.