Darden, J.
Statement of the Case
Dawn Riddle and Matthew Riddle sued Syed J. Khan, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist specializing in child and adolescent psychiatry; Chaitanya Chekkilla, M.D., a board-certified specialist in family medicine; and Christopher J. Scruton, Ph.D., a psychologist, when the doctors treated two of the Riddles’ children after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed them from the Riddles’ custody. The Riddles filed a lawsuit claiming the doctors violated their parental federal constitutional rights, pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 (1996) (“§ 1983”) by treating their children without their permission. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors. The Riddles appeal, and we affirm.
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We first turn to the merits of the Riddles’ § 1983 claims against Doctors Chekkilla and Scruton. The dispositive question is whether there are disputes of material fact as to whether Doctors Chekkilla and Scruton acted under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors, and private individuals in collaboration with state officials, from using a badge of authority to deprive individuals of rights guaranteed by the constitution. K.M.K. v. A.K., 908 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. For a private individual to act under color of law, there must be evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that individual. Id. To establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) those individual(s) were willing participants in joint activity with the State or its agents. Id.
We turn to the evidence regarding Dr. Chekkilla. The Riddles do not dispute that Dr. Chekkilla worked for a private company, was not an employee of the State, and did not have any contact with DCS or juvenile court personnel. Further, it appears that Cress, who had legal custody and care of M.R., chose to take M.R. to Dr. Chekkilla’s office on her own initiative to establish primary health care on behalf of M.R. There is no evidence that anyone at DCS directed, encouraged, or suggested that Cress select Dr. Chekkilla to provide medical care to M.R. In addition, there is no evidence that the doctor, prior to the presentation of M.R. for medical treatment, had ever met Cress, M.R., juvenile court personnel, or any DCS official involved in M.R.’s case. Finally, there is no evidence that Dr. Chekkilla played any role in M.R.’s removal from the Riddles’ care or her placement with Cress.
When Cress presented M.R. at Dr. Chekkilla’s office for a medical examination, Cress displayed written documentation from DCS dated September 27, 2016, which stated that Cress was authorized to seek medical care on behalf of M.R. During the examination, M.R. revealed that she was experiencing long, heavy, and painful menstrual periods, and her symptoms were getting worse. Subsequently, Dr. Chekkilla diagnosed M.R. with Dysmenorrhea, entailing heavy bleeding and severe pain. After completing the medical examination of M.R., and based on the applicable standard of care, Dr. Chekkilla refilled M.R.’s prescriptions for Celexa and Buspar and further recommended a hormone medication called Levora for the treatment of M.R.’s very painful Dysmenorrhea.
Dr. Chekkilla did not consult with any DCS officials before or during the examination. She later wrote a letter explaining why M.R. should be treated with Levora and stating that she was not recommending the medication for birth control purposes. DCS then submitted the information to the juvenile court for its approval of the treatment for M.R., and Dr. Chekkilla played no part in the court proceedings. In summary, there is no evidence the doctor spoke with DCS or other state officials, let alone reached an understanding with state officials to deprive the Riddles of their constitutional rights. Further, the Riddles have not designated or presented any evidence to refute or rebut the standard of medical care rendered by Dr. Chekkilla to M.R. or to show any involvement by her in the trial court proceedings.
The Riddles further argue Dr. Chekkilla was a state actor because: (1) DCS had presented to the juvenile court the letter the doctor explaining why she had prescribed Levora; (2) the doctor’s office accepted M.R. as a patient with the knowledge she was the subject of a DCS proceeding; and (3) Dr. Chekkilla’s employer, Community Physician Services, has provided services to DCS under contract in Indiana. None of these facts are relevant to demonstrate a common understanding between the doctor and DCS or any other state actor to sustain a violation of the Riddles’ parental constitutional rights. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Dr. Chekkilla. See K.M.K., 908 N.E.2d at 663 (private attorney did not qualify as state actor for purposes of § 1983; merely petitioning a trial court for relief did not amount to conspiring with a state official to violate a person’s constitutional rights). The Riddles have not presented or designated any evidence to establish that Dr. Chekkilla was a State employee or that she conspired or joined with any State officials to deprive the Riddles of their constitutional rights of any kind. Mere assertions of harm or deprivation of rights, without more, cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Turning to Dr. Scruton’s treatment of J.R., the Riddles do not dispute that the doctor worked for a private company. Further, the record does not contain evidence of any communications between the doctor and DCS’s officials, juvenile court personnel, or other state actors. In his summary judgment documents, Dr. Scruton stated only that he regularly treated J.R. beginning on November 9, 2016, until June 26, 2017. In response, the Riddles did not present or designate any evidence demonstrating that DCS staff selected Dr. Scruton as J.R.’s psychologist or otherwise worked in concert with the doctor in his treatment of J.R. We must affirm a grant of summary judgment on any evidence in the record, and there is no material evidence showing that Dr. Scruton joined or conspired with DCS to deprive the Riddles of their constitutional rights.
In addition, there are also no disputes of material fact as to whether Dr. Scruton deprived the Riddles of a constitutionally protected right. There is no evidence that he played any role in the removal of J.R. from the Riddles’ custody. Further, the Riddles did not designate any evidence in the form of affidavits witnesses, admissions, depositions, or otherwise, to show that they expressed disagreement with Dr. Scruton’s treatment of J.R.; that his treatment did not meet the applicable standard of care; or any evidence of how the doctor’s treatment damaged their parent-child relationship with J.R. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Dr. Scruton.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.