Brown, J.
Mark A. Bonds appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. We reverse and remand.
…
On November 13, 2012, the court sentenced Bonds to concurrent sentences of thirty years with twenty-five years executed, five years suspended, and three years of probation. In its Order of Judgment of Conviction, the court stated: “The Defendant is entitled to ___ days credit for time spent in confinement before sentencing.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 7. The court ordered the Department of Correction (“DOC”) to award credit time in accord with Indiana law and found Bonds to be a sexually violent predator. The abstract of judgment specified that the dates of confinement prior to sentencing were from September 28, 2010, to November 12, 2012, for a total of 777 days.
On July 7, 2020, Bonds filed a Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence and asserted the court “determined that [he] was entitled to (777) days credit for time being confined in jail from 9-28-10 to 11-12-12 while awaiting sentence” but “failed to include in its Judg[]ment of Conviction (777) days of Class (I) earned credit which was earned while [he] was in Jail awaiting sentence . . . .” July 7, 2020 Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence at 2. He also filed a memorandum in support of his motion and argued the court determined that he was entitled to 777 days of credit for time served in jail but failed to give him credit for good behavior. On July 8, 2020, the court denied Bonds’ motion and stated that sentencing judgments that report only days spent in pre-sentence confinement and do not expressly designate earned credit time shall be understood by the courts and the DOC automatically to award credit days equal to pre-sentence confinement days.
…
An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-1251 (Ind. 2008).
…
“[S]uch a motion may only be filed to address a sentence that is ‘erroneous on its face.’” Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1251 (quoting Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, (Ind. 2004) (citation omitted)). “Other sentencing errors must be addressed via direct appeal or post-conviction relief.” Id. “An allegation by an inmate that the trial court has not included credit time earned in its sentencing is the type of claim appropriately advanced by a motion to correct sentence.” Id.
…
The Court observed that “[t]he remedy of a motion to correct sentence arising from Indiana Code § 35-38-1-15 speaks only in terms of ‘sentence,’ not ‘judgment of conviction,’” and “nevertheless [held] that the ‘sentence’ that is subject to correction under this procedure means the trial court’s judgment of conviction imposing the sentence and not the trial court’s entries on the [DOC’s] abstract of judgment form.” Id. The Court also held that “[i]t is the court’s judgment of conviction and not the abstract of judgment that is the official trial court record and which thereafter is the controlling document.” Id
The court’s Order of Judgment of Conviction did not specify the days of credit for time spent in confinement. Specifically, the Order of Judgment of Conviction stated: “The Defendant is entitled to ___ days credit for time spent in confinement before sentencing.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 7. While the abstract of judgment stated that Bonds had been confined for 777 days prior to sentencing, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the “sentence” that is subject to correction under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 “means the trial court’s judgment of conviction imposing the sentence and not the trial court’s entries on the [DOC’s] abstract of judgment form.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 794. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction which includes the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing. See Crow v. State, 805 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ind. 2004) (holding that the trial court’s sentencing judgment statement that “defendant is entitled to 179 days of credit time” was sufficiently ambiguous so as to constitute an erroneous sentence on the face of the judgment of conviction, reversing the denial of the defendant’s motion to correct erroneous sentence, and remanding for correction)
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand.
Reversed and remanded
Bradford, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.