Crone, J.
Case Summary
Brent C. Faulk (Father) appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to Callie J. (Bissell) Faulk (Mother), in which the trial court changed the surname of the parties’ son (Child) from Bissell to Bissell-Faulk. Father argues that the trial court erred in not changing Child’s surname to match his, in calculating Mother’s income and his income for child support purposes, and in placing limits on his opportunities for additional parenting time. We conclude that the trial court erred in changing Child’s surname and in calculating Mother’s income, but that it did not err in calculating Father’s income or in placing limits on his opportunities for additional parenting time. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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Father first contends that the trial court erred in changing Child’s surname to Bissell-Faulk, claiming that it is in Child’s “best interests to bear the surname Faulk.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. We agree with Father that the trial court erred in changing Child’s surname, but strictly on the basis that the trial court had no statutory authority to do so.
Our supreme court has explained that under the common law, “a person may lawfully change his or her name without resort to any legal proceedings where it does not interfere with the rights of others and is not done for a fraudulent purpose.” Leone v. Comm’r, Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. 2010). “A person effects a common-law change of name by usage or habit.” Id. “The very nature of a common-law name change means it does not require a court’s approval.” Id. But “only a statutorily authorized court order gives legal sanction to a name change.” Id. at 1254. Here, the trial court had no statutory authority to order a change of Child’s legal name.
Of the many statutes governing marital dissolution actions, only Indiana Code Section 31-15-2-18 authorizes a name change, and that is for “[a] woman who desires the restoration of her maiden or previous married name[.]” The woman “must set out the name she desires to be restored to her in her petition for dissolution as part of the relief sought. The court shall grant the name change upon entering the decree of dissolution.” Id. Mother’s petition does not appear in the record before us, but we presume that she must have requested a name change because the trial court restored her maiden name in the decree.
The only statute that would authorize a name change for Child is Indiana Code Section 34-28-2-2, which requires “a parent or guardian who wishes to change the name of a child” to file a petition, which “must be verified” and “must state in detail the reason the change is requested.” Ind. Code § 34-28-2-2(b). 2 In addition, with exceptions not relevant here, “the written consent of a parent, or the written consent of the guardian if both parents are dead, must be filed with the petition.” Id. “Before a minor child’s name may be changed, the parents or guardian of the child must be served with a copy of the petition as required by the Indiana trial rules.” Ind. Code § 34-28-2-2(c). And, upon filing a petition for a name change, the applicant must give public notice of the petition pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-28-2-3. None of these procedures were followed in this case, and therefore Child’s name change was not authorized by statute. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Child’s surname change in finding 87 of the decree.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Najam, J., concurs.
Riley, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
Riley, Judge concurring in part and dissenting in part
While I agree with the majority’s holding with respect to the parties’ income for child support purposes and placing limits on Father’s opportunities for additional parenting time, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion regarding Father’s request to change the Child’s surname. Even though I agree with the majority’s analysis that the legislature instituted a procedure for the name change of a minor child in Ind. Code Ch. 34-28-2, it should be noted that neither the parties nor the trial court relied on this statute or proceeding but rather formulated the request for the name change as an issue within the framework of the dissolution proceeding and Mother did not object to proceeding as such.
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I acknowledge that there has been a change in modern attitudes and practices regarding the surname of children born in and out of wedlock. Thus, I do not suggest, as was considered in Laks, that predominant consideration should be given to a father’s interest in preserving the family name through his child, nor do I suggest that a traditional right exists for a child to bear his or her father’s surname. However, in light of the specific circumstances of this case, I cannot conclude that it would be in the Child’s best interest to be given a hyphenated family name. During his life, no siblings will ever share his last name, nor will his parents or any older relative have the same last name. Accordingly, based on the evidence before us, I find that the trial court abused its discretion by hyphenating the Child’s surname.