Tavitas, J.
The right to the assistance of counsel is among the most fundamental rights afforded by the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution. On appeal from her conviction for possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor, Christa Vonhoene alleges she was denied this essential right.
Following her initial hearing, during which Vonhoene received and acknowledged her legal rights both verbally and in writing, Vonhoene notified the trial court that she intended to secure private counsel. Approximately five months later, on the morning of her scheduled bench trial, Vonhoene indicated to the trial court that, although she had intended to secure counsel, she was unable to afford counsel and was uncertain about how to request courtappointed counsel. Vonhoene moved for a continuance of the bench trial to allow her to secure legal counsel.
Citing Vonhoene’s delay, the trial court’s prior grant of a continuance, and the court’s prior advisements, the court found that Vonhoene “waived” her right to the assistance of counsel by her dilatory conduct. The trial court denied the motion to continue, presided over the bench trial with Vonhoene proceeding pro se, and Vonhoene was convicted.
Based on the record on appeal, we agree that Vonhoene was denied her fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. The record does not support a finding that Vonhoene either waived or forfeited her right to assistance of counsel by her conduct. Moreover, Vonhoene’s disclosures before her bench trial triggered the trial court’s duty to conduct further inquiry that the court did not undertake regarding Vonhoene’s eligibility for pauper counsel. We decline to presume that Vonhoene acquiesced in the outright relinquishment of her fundamental right to the assistance of counsel to the extent that she would stand trial—a critical stage of the proceedings below—without counsel. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an indigency hearing and for a new trial.
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Vonhoene argues that the trial court’s determination that she should proceed pro se violated her constitutional right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the accused, in a criminal prosecution, shall “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const. Amendment VI. Likewise, Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be heard by himself and counsel[.]”
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Here, Vonhoene had the right to counsel at each critical stage of a criminal matter, unless she relinquished her right by waiver, forfeiture, or forfeiture with knowledge. See Hernandez, 761 N.E.2d at 849; see also Gilmore, 953 N.E.2d at 589-90. We begin by addressing waiver. The record does not indicate that Vonhoene expressly and verbally waived her right to the assistance of counsel. To the contrary, Vonhoene signaled her intention to proceed with legal representation at various stages of the proceedings; 7 thus, the record lends no support to a finding that Vonhoene waived her right to the assistance of counsel.
We, next, turn to the question of whether Vonhoene forfeited, by her conduct, her essential right to the assistance of counsel. The record does not support such a finding. Vonhoene interacted with the trial court respectfully and did not display any qualifying obstreperous behavior or other serious misconduct. See, e.g., Gilmore, 953 N.E.2d at 589 (finding a defendant may forfeit his or her right to the assistance of counsel by being abusive to counsel). Thus, we conclude that Vonhoene did not forfeit her right to counsel by her conduct.
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Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in determining that Vonhoene “waived” her right to the assistance of counsel. Vonhoene has successfully demonstrated that she was improperly denied her fundamental right to counsel. To find otherwise, we would have to presume Vonhoene’s acquiescence in the loss of her right to the appointment of counsel; this we cannot do. See Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 999 (“Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right [to counsel], and likewise will not presume the defendant’s acquiescence in its loss.”).
We have decided, supra, that Vonhoene did not waive her right to the assistance of counsel. We now turn to Vonhoene’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent her after she reiterated her desire to secure counsel and mentioned her inability to pay for an attorney.
Here, the record is clear that Vonhoene signaled to the trial court her sustained desire for legal counsel, her potential indigency, and her confusion regarding obtaining appointed counsel. Vonhoene’s statements triggered a duty on the part of the trial court to: (1) inquire on the record into Vonhoene’s desire for the assistance of counsel and her finances; and (2) assuming Vonhoene was indigent, to appoint pauper counsel to represent Vonhoene during her bench trial. Because the trial court erroneously concluded that Vonhoene “waived” her right to the assistance of counsel, the court failed to deploy its “protecting duty” to Vonhoene’s detriment as is evidenced by the silent record. See Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 999-1000 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465). Moreover, the denial of Vonhoene’s requested continuance under these circumstances is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Vonhoene did not waive or forfeit her right to the assistance of counsel; and the trial court’s denial of Vonhoene’s requested continuance to allow her to retain counsel, coupled with the court’s failure to investigate Vonhoene’s eligibility for appointed counsel, constituted error that violated Vonhoene’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13. We can confidently presume that Vonhoene suffered prejudice, see Hernandez, 761 N.E.2d at 849, from the bench trial record wherein Vonhoene: (1) failed to lodge any objections, including to the admission of the alleged contraband; (2) admitted that the contraband was, in fact, marijuana; (3) failed to meaningfully cross-examine the State’s lone witness; and (4) elected to testify in her defense.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to vacate Vonhoene’s conviction and sentence, determine whether Vonhoene is indigent and eligible for appointment of counsel, and for a new trial.
The trial court erred in finding that Vonhoene forfeited by her conduct her right to the assistance of counsel. The trial court also erred in proceeding to trial, with Vonhoene proceeding pro se, without first investigating Vonhoene’s alleged indigency and her eligibility for pauper counsel. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.