Friedlander, S.J.
In this consolidated appeal, three parents appeal the denials of their petitions to change their children’s gender markers as set forth on the children’s birth certificates. We reverse and remand with instructions.
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The parents argue the trial courts erred in denying their petitions, claiming: (1) parents have the authority to seek a gender marker change on their children’s birth certificates; and (2) they established they are entitled to relief. This appeal presents questions of law, which we review de novo. In re A.L., 81 N.E.3d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
We first address whether the parents were allowed to seek the gender marker changes. The Indiana Department of Health “may make additions to or corrections in a certificate of birth on receipt of adequate documentary evidence . . . .” Ind. Code § 16-37-2-10(b) (1995). The documentary evidence may include court orders. See In re Petition for Change of Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding a trial court has the authority to order a correction of a gender marker on an adult’s birth certificate). The Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles expressly acknowledges that a birth certificate may be amended to show a change in a person’s gender. 140 Ind. Admin. Code § 7- 1.1-3(b)(1)(B) (2017). The question is whether a parent has the authority to ask a court to amend the gender marker on a minor child’s birth certificate.
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Considering the broad language of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-10(b), and the wide authority of parents to make decisions about their children’s lives, we conclude the trial court in C.V.’s case erred in stating C.V.’s father lacked the authority to request a change to the gender marker on C.V.’s birth certificate. See In re Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d 707 (concluding the trial court has the authority to change a gender marker on an adult’s birth certificate based on the general statutory authority governing amendment of birth certificates, as well as the trial court’s inherent equitable power to grant such relief).
Next, the parents claim they are entitled to have their petitions granted. They further claim the appropriate standard for a trial court to apply when considering a petition to change gender marker is whether the petition was filed in good faith. We disagree.
As for a petition to change gender marker on a birth certificate, when an adult requests that relief, “the ultimate focus should be on whether the petition is made in good faith and not for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose.” In re Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d at 710. That standard tracks the standard for an adult seeking to change his or her name. By contrast, when a parent petitions to change a child’s gender marker, similar to requesting a name change for a child, we conclude the appropriate standard is whether the change is in the child’s best interests.
In determining the best interests of the child for a gender marker change, a trial court may consider the same factors as for a name change. Indiana Code section 34-28-2-4 instructs a trial court ruling on a petition for a name change to consider the factors set forth in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 (2017), which governs child custody. Those factors include:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parent or parents;
(B) the child’s sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The physical and mental health of all individuals involved.
Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.
The trial court in C.V.’s case did not reach the issue of whether C.V.’s father had demonstrated a gender marker change was in C.V.’s best interests, and we cannot determine whether the trial court in A.B.’s and O.S.’s cases applied the best interests standard. Under these circumstances, the trial courts should be given an opportunity to reconsider the petitions using the correct standard of review.
For the reasons stated above, in all three trial court cases, we reverse the denial of the parents’ petitions and remand with instructions to address the petitions in accordance with the best interest standard.
Judgments reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, J., concurs
Pyle, J., dissents with opinion.
Pyle, Judge dissenting with opinion.
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’s opinion reversing the judgments of the respective trial courts. My colleagues seek, based upon the holdings in In re the Petition for Change of Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d 707 (Ind. Ct. App 2014) and Matter of R.E., 142 N.E.3d 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), to shoehorn a remedy for the petitioners that does not yet exist. However, the shoe does not fit. As a result, my colleagues have strayed into an area reserved for our General Assembly. IND. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (reserving the legislative power for the General Assembly).
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