Massa, J.
UJ-Eighty Corporation owns a fraternity house at Indiana University (IU) in Bloomington. The house sits within a district zoned by the City of Bloomington to permit limited residential uses. At the relevant time, fraternities and sororities in the district were required to be sanctioned or recognized by IU. UJ-Eighty leased its house to an IU-sanctioned fraternity. Before the lease ended, IU revoked its recognition and approval of the fraternity, meaning no one could reside there. But two residents remained, so Bloomington cited UJ-Eighty for a zoning violation. The City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirmed.
UJ-Eighty sought judicial review under both the state and federal constitutions, arguing Bloomington impermissibly delegated its zoning authority to IU by allowing it to unilaterally define fraternities and sororities. The trial court granted relief, and an appellate panel affirmed. However, we conclude Bloomington did not delegate any authority to IU; it merely defined fraternities and sororities in zoning law based on their relationship with IU. While this may have had a “collateral effect” on land use, it was not a delegation. Thus, there were no constitutional violations. We reverse.
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UJ-Eighty’s arguments under the state and federal constitutions hinge on the same allegation: Bloomington improperly delegated the unilateral authority to define “fraternity” and “sorority” to IU. Our review of the Ordinance reveals Bloomington never empowered IU to define fraternities and sororities, a power IU already clearly possesses. Bloomington, rather—through the legislative process—defined fraternities and sororities based on their relationship with IU. It did not delegate any authority, legislative or otherwise. Because there was no improper delegation or other denial of due process, there were no constitutional violations.
I. Bloomington did not violate the Indiana Constitution because it did not improperly delegate legislative authority to IU.
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The Ordinance’s definition of “fraternity” and “sorority” was no different than many of its other definitions that referenced an outside entity. See, e.g., Bloomington, Ind. Mun. Code § 20.11.020 (2017) (requiring a “‘group care home for mentally ill’ . . . be a licensed facility with the state”). Bloomington did not delegate legislative authority to any of these entities. It merely defined certain land uses based on their relationships with relevant outside organizations. While the Ordinance’s “through whatever procedures” language for fraternities and sororities was broad, it did not turn a definition into a delegation. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 247 (2012) (“A statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.”). The Ordinance did not obligate IU to act or directly empower it to write zoning law. Rather, it helped define fraternities and sororities by ensuring their relationship with IU was the deciding factor, not the process that created the relationship. That was a permissible legislative judgment, not an impermissible delegation.
II. Bloomington did not violate the United States Constitution because it did not improperly delegate authority to IU or otherwise deprive UJ-Eighty of due process.
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It was not IU that decided whether UJ-Eighty or any other landowner violated Bloomington’s zoning laws. Bloomington, through the BZA, ultimately decided. The members of the BZA were free to exercise their authority as they wished, subject to lawful constraints. If UJ-Eighty is unhappy with Bloomington’s zoning laws or the BZA, it can seek change through the political process.
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We agree with Schweizer. Just like the landowners there, UJ-Eighty has failed to show it was deprived of due process aside from the alleged delegation. It never establishes it was prohibited from supporting TKE during IU’s proceedings. As TKE’s landlord, it would have been reasonable to remain aware of any potential problems and support its tenant as necessary. UJ-Eighty also never alleged that IU lacked authority to discipline TKE. And UJ-Eighty failed to identify any procedural irregularities with IU’s process for revoking TKE’s sanction, including any constitutional or statutory violations. As in Schweizer, UJ-Eighty has not established that any action by IU, Bloomington, or the BZA violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Ordinance did nothing more than define fraternities and sororities based on their relationship with IU. It was not a delegation of power; rather, it was a legislative decision on how to define a certain land use. And UJ-Eighty failed to establish how, outside the alleged delegation, it was denied due process. Thus, Bloomington did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conclusion
The impermissible delegation of power and denial of due process strike at the core of our state and federal constitutions. Courts should guard against such significant constitutional violations. However, for there to be a violation, there must be some delegation or lack of due process. Here, there was none. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.