Pyle, J.
Jason Ball (“Ball”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition seeking the
expungement of his criminal convictions. The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ball’s petition. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Ball’s expungement petition.
We reverse and remand with instructions.
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Ball argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his expungement petition. We agree.
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Here, Ball filed his petition to expunge his Level C felonies pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-9-4, which is a discretionary, or permissive, expungement statute. The Indiana Supreme Court recently explained that “[b]ecause the Permissive Expungement Statute excludes from eligibility persons convicted of certain offenses, but vests in the court the discretion to either grant or deny a petition, a trial court should engage in a two-step process when considering a petition for expungement.” Allen v. State, 159 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2020). First, the trial court must determine whether the conviction is eligible for expungement and whether the petitioner has met the requirements. Id. (citing I.C. §§ 35-38-9-4(b), -4(e)). If the conviction is ineligible, the trial court’s inquiry ends there. Allen, 159 N.E.3d at 585. However, if the trial court determines that the conviction is eligible for expungement, it must then collect enough information to determine whether it should grant or deny the expungement petition. Id.
Pursuant to Allen, we turn first to the statute’s eligibility requirements. INDIANA CODE § 35-38-9-4 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (e) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the period required by this section has elapsed; (2) no charges are pending against the person; (3) the person has paid all fines, fees, and court costs, and satisfied any restitution obligation placed on the person as part of the sentence; and (4) the person has not been convicted of a crime within the previous eight (8) years (or within a shorter period agreed to by the prosecuting attorney if the prosecuting attorney had consented to a shorter period under subsection (c)); the court may order the conviction records described in subsection (c), including any records relating to the conviction and any records concerning a collateral action, marked as expunged in accordance with section 7 of this chapter[.]
Here, the trial court essentially found that Ball’s convictions were ineligible for expungement because Ball’s brother, who was Ball’s co-defendant, rather than Ball, had paid the restitution in the case. Ball argues that the trial court misinterpreted the statute, and we agree.
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Here, as a result of the trial court’s construction of the statute, the convictions of a co-defendant who pays the restitution are eligible for expungement, leaving the convictions of his or her co-defendant or co-defendants ineligible for expungement. This is an absurd result that the legislature surely did not intend. See id.
Our review of the record reveals that, in 2016, Ball tendered to the trial court a probation department letter, which stated that Ball had paid his probation fees and that restitution had been paid by the co-defendants. Nearly four years later, in his second petition seeking expungement of his felony convictions, Ball tendered to the trial court a certified letter from the county clerk stating that there was no restitution balance due in his case.
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We hold that where, as here, a co-defendant in the same case has compensated the victim, the statutory restitution obligation has been satisfied. See Ind. Code § 35-38-9-4(e)(3). As a result, Ball has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the restitution in his case has been satisfied. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that his convictions were ineligible for expungement.
Having determined that Ball’s convictions were eligible for expungement, we now review the trial court’s remaining reasons for denying Ball’s petition.
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Here, our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s remaining reasons for denying Ball’s petition were that: (1) Ball was “seek[ing] to expunge two Felony convictions, not one, as characterized by [Ball] throughout his Motion to Reconsider as ‘the offense’[;]” and (2) “handguns valued at over $16,000.00 were stolen during a burglary[.]”
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Specifically, although Ball committed two felony offenses when he was sixteen years old, for the past twenty years, Ball has been a law-abiding citizen. The letters that he tendered to the trial court attest to his good character and strong work ethic. Ball is married and has four children, and his convictions have prevented him from volunteering at his children’s schools and participating in class field trips. In addition, Ball has owned a real estate business for eighteen years and a heating and air conditioning business for twelve years. His convictions have prevented him from servicing specific clients. Further, although Ball is an active volunteer in the community, there are certain agencies that will not allow him to volunteer because of his felony convictions. Ball explained that he is particularly interested in volunteering for Angel Flight and would start immediately if his convictions were expunged.
“Although the trial court is granted discretion, this does not extend to disregard the remedial measures enacted by our lawmakers. As previously observed, such statutes should be liberally construed to advance the remedy for which they were enacted.” Cline, 61 N.E.3d at 363. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ball’s petition for expungement. See Cline, 61 N.E.3d at 363 (reversing the denial of an expungement petition where the petitioner had obtained advanced education and had been promoted at work). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Ball’s petition and to order his records to be marked as expunged pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-9-7.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, J., and Brown, J., concur.