May, J.
John D. Wilder appeals the trial court’s decision regarding the attorney fees due to his attorney, Ronald Weldy, under Indiana Code section 22-2-5-2. Wilder makes several arguments, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it calculated the attorney fees due to Weldy under Indiana Code section 22-2-5-2 for his work at the trial court level; and
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it calculated the attorney fees due to Weldy for his work at the appellate court level.
DeGood Dimensional Concepts, Inc. (“DeGood”) cross-appeals, asking us to reexamine the inclusion of certain hours in the amount awarded to Wilder’s attorney, Weldy, for certain trial work. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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In its order on remand, the trial court awarded Wilder $10,140.00 in appellate attorney fees for “33.8 hours of appellate and other work” completed by Wilder’s attorney, Weldy. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 18.) The trial court also found a “reasonable hourly rate for these services provided in Kosciusko County is $300.00 per hour.” (Id.) On appeal, Wilder argues the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded $10,140.00 in appellate attorney fees because “[a]ppellate work is sophisticated work which requires adherence to a myriad of rules, very good writing skills and experience” and thus “$500.00 per hour is reasonable for appellate work.” (Br. of Appellant at 11.)
The trial court stated during the hearing on the parties’ motions to correct errors that it gets “to set the rate in Kosciusko County[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 29.) Additionally, the trial court advised Wilder:
[M]aybe you ought to rethink how you make a living then because then you’re subject to having your fees set by a judge who may not be, which I think I am considerate of your needs and thoughts but who doesn’t actually care right. Maybe I should find it’s 100 bucks an hour. I don’t know.
(Id. at 33.) During that hearing, and the hearing on remand, there was no evidence presented to support a rate of $300 per hour for appellate attorney fees. Based on the trial court’s statements, we thus infer the trial court took judicial notice of the reasonable appellate attorney fees in the local area. In the case In re Lockyear, 261 Ind. 448, 305 N.E.2d 440 (1974), our Indiana Supreme Court held that a trial court could take judicial notice of what constitutes a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees – meaning neither party had to provide evidence thereof, and the trial court could set the rate based on its judicial notice of the prevailing rate in the area. Id. at 460, 305 N.E.2d 447.
However, in Berkemeier v. Rushville National Bank, 438 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), our court held that judicial notice of reasonable attorney’s fees should be limited to routine cases involving relatively small amounts. While the term “small amount” has not been precisely defined, a damages award of over $20,000 is not a “small amount,” nor is a total attorney fee award of over $30,000 for a case encompassing almost a decade a “small amount.” We therefore conclude the trial court could not take judicial notice of the prevailing rate for appellate services in the local area and there must be evidence on the record to support its decision. See Lake County Trust Co. v. Gainer Bank, N.A., 555 N.E.2d 1356, 1362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting attorney fees could not be awarded until evidence to support the amount is presented), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
There was, however, evidence on the record to support other hourly rates for Weldy’s appellate attorney fees. In his affidavit in support of his request for appellate attorney fees on remand, Weldy indicated he billed some of his appellate work, such as “appellate related matters that are routine in every appeal” at a rate of $400.00 per hour. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23.) Weldy billed $500.00 per hour for “appellate related matters [that] were caused by mistakes or omission of Defendant” and “working on the appellate briefs in this matter.” (Id. at 24.) Weldy’s fee invoice reflected these charges.
Wilder also included affidavits from three other attorneys who worked on wage-related claims regarding their rates for appellate work. One attorney indicated he charged “$385.00 per hour, for both litigation and appellate legal work” in 2015. (Id. at 30.) Another attorney stated he charged $400.00 per hour and that rate was “similar or slightly lower than other attorneys of similar levels of experience and skill who regularly represent plaintiffs in wage and hour litigation throughout the State of Indiana.” (Id. at 33.) A final attorney opined “that rates in between $400.00 per hour and $500.00 per hour for trial court work in . . . state trial courts throughout northern Indiana is customary and reasonable.” (Id. at 56.) DeGood did not present evidence regarding a reasonable hourly rate for appellate work in the area. {Footnote omitted.]
In the interest of judicial efficiency, we conclude, that the lowest current amount provided by the evidence was $400.00 per hour. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award of $10,410.00 in appellate attorney fees for 33.8 hours of work at a rate of $300.00 per hour. We remand the matter to the trial court to enter an order awarding Wilder $13,520.00 in appellate attorney fees for 33.8 hours of work at a rate of $400.00 per hour. We also remand for calculation of the hours Weldy expended on the appeal before us, and order the trial court to award him appellate attorney fees for those hours at a rate of $400.00 per hour.
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Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Wilder $3,329.00 in additional trial attorney fees. However, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wilder’s attorney, Weldy, $10,410.00 in appellate attorney fees because there was no evidence to support the $300.00 hourly rate the trial court used to calculate the appellate attorney fees award. Finally, DeGood has waived any argument regarding certain billing entries in Weldy’s billing invoice because it presented that issue for the first time in a motion to correct error.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s award of additional trial attorney fees. We reverse the trial court’s award of appellate attorney fees. We remand for the trial court to enter an order awarding Wilder $13,520.00 in appellate attorney fees for 33.8 hours of work at a rate of $400.00 per hour. We also remand for calculation of the hours Weldy expended on the appeal before us, and we order the trial court to award Wilder appellate attorney fees for those hours at a rate of $400.00 per hour.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, C.J., concur.