Robb, J.
Following a jury trial, Deshay Hackner was convicted of two counts of murder; two counts of robbery, Level 5 felonies; and admitted to possessing a firearm and being an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Hackner to an aggregate sentence of 157 years. Hackner now appeals and raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
…
Hackner contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that Broomfield nodded in response to Officer Brewer’s question about the identity of his shooter because it “was all based on an invalid dying declaration[,] was irrelevant and highly and unfairly confusing and prejudicial.” Brief of Appellant at 16. We disagree.
Hearsay is a statement that “is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and . . . is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). A “statement” is an “oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct if the person intended it as an assertion.” Evid. R. 801(a). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls into one of the well-delineated hearsay exceptions. Evid. R. 802.
A statement made by the declarant, “while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances” is admissible under the dying declaration hearsay exception. Evid. R. 804(b)(2). In order to determine if a declarant’s statements were made with the belief that “death was imminent” and the declarant had “abandoned all hope of recovery,” the trial court may consider the general statements, conduct, manner, symptoms, and condition of the declarant, which flow as reasonable and natural results from the extent and character of the wound or state of the illness. Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The admissibility of a “dying declaration” is based on the belief that persons making such statements are highly unlikely to lie. Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
Hackner does not challenge that Broomfield’s nonverbal act was made with the belief that his death was imminent while abandoning all hope of recovery. Instead, he claims that “[g]iven the suffering of Broomfield and his agonal movements, [we] should find that a nod is too ambiguous to be considered a nonverbal dying declaration.” However, we believe the interpretation of Broomfield’s alleged nonverbal act, which was not captured on Officer Brewer’s body camera, is not a question of admissibility; instead, it bears more on Officer Brewer’s credibility, a question solely for the finder of fact. See Sandefur v. State, 945 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting the State’s argument that an officer’s testimony about nonverbal assertive conduct was not hearsay because it was his own interpretation of someone’s conduct and stating that “the lack of certainty [about what the victim meant to say] bears more on the credibility of the testimony than whether it is hearsay”).
Here, the jury listened to the 911 call during which Broomfield identifies “Why man[,]” “Deshaw Hacker,” “Deshay. D. and William Rice,” and “Deshawn Hackner” as his shooters. Tr., Vol. III at 5-11. It watched the body camera footage and observed the events unfold and listened to Officer Brewer’s testimony in court. The extent to which the jury relies on Broomfield’s nod and accepts Officer Brewer’s interpretation, and whether or not the evidence connects Hackner with the crimes, ultimately goes to the weight the jury may assign evidence, not admissibility. See Jones v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. 1985) (“If the evidence only inconclusively connects the defendant with the crime, this goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence. . . . [T]he weight to be given identification evidence and any determination of whether it is satisfactory and trustworthy is a function of the trier of facts.”); see also Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (stating that it is the jury’s role, not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine if it is sufficient to support a conviction). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Broomfield’s statement. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.