Goff, J.
Our legislature provided a mechanism by which people convicted of certain crimes can obtain a fresh start by seeking expungement of those convictions. For certain minor convictions, expungement is mandatory if the petitioner meets certain criteria. For more serious convictions, the trial court retains the discretion to determine whether the circumstances warrant an expungement. Courts considering whether to grant a discretionary expungement are tasked with looking at the unique facts of each case to determine whether the individual has demonstrated that his case merits a fresh start.
The defendant here challenges the trial court’s decision to deny his petition for expungement, contending that the court erroneously determined that he was ineligible for expungement. Because the trial court may have denied the petition on the erroneous belief that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4(b)(3) rendered the defendant ineligible for expungement, we reverse and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
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Indiana Code chapter 35-38-9 governs the sealing and expungement of a person’s conviction records. Under the Permissive Expungement Statute, a trial court may order conviction records expunged if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the requisite period has elapsed (eight years from the date of conviction or three years from the completion of the sentence); (2) no charges are pending against the person; (3) the applicable fines, costs, and restitution have been paid; and (4) the person has not been convicted of a crime within the previous eight years (or a shorter period agreed to by the prosecutor). I.C. § 35-38-9-4(e). However, the Permissive Expungement Statute expressly does not apply (i.e., a conviction may not be expunged) if the felony “resulted in serious bodily injury to another person.” I.C. § 35-38-9-4(b)(3) (the SBI Exclusion).
There’s no question that Allen met all of the conditions in subsection 4(e) of the Permissive Expungement Statute. The only question is whether his conviction for Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary (the crime for which he stood convicted) is eligible or ineligible for expungement under the SBI Exclusion. Allen and Amicus Curiae argue that, because that crime resulted in no serious bodily injury to another person, the trial court erred by denying his motion. The State, on the other hand, argues that the SBI Exclusion renders Allen ineligible for expungement because the facts incidental to his conviction involved serious bodily injury.
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In Trout v. State, the Court of Appeals held that, because “that” is a restrictive clause, the felony of conviction must have resulted in bodily injury to another person. 28 N.E.3d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
The logic of Trout applies with equal force in this case. The phrasing of the statutes calls for the same result: a person may be eligible for expungement unless the felony for which he stands convicted resulted in serious bodily injury to another person. That the facts of the incident leading to the conviction show serious bodily injury is not enough to exclude a person from eligibility for expungement.
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While Allen was charged with crimes that involved bodily injury to another person (e.g., aggravated battery and battery with a deadly weapon), those charges were dismissed when he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit burglary. Conspiracy to commit burglary doesn’t result in bodily injury to another person. Allen isn’t excluded from eligibility for expungement under the SBI Exclusion because he wasn’t “convicted of a felony that resulted in serious bodily injury to another person.” I.C. § 35- 38-9-4(b)(3).
The fact that Allen was eligible for expungement doesn’t end the inquiry, however, because, unlike the Mandatory Expungement Statute at issue in Trout, the Permissive Expungement Statute vests discretion in the trial court to deny expungement.
The trial court didn’t indicate why it denied Allen’s petition for expungement. At the hearing on the petition, the State questioned whether Allen was eligible, leaving the court itself in doubt. In the order denying Allen’s petition, the trial court found “in its discretion” that the petition should be denied, but the court didn’t discuss the basis of its decision.
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Indiana courts generally construe expungement statutes liberally to advance the remedy for which they were enacted. Id. However, the legislature also clearly recognized that some convictions require a more detailed examination before they are expunged. Unlike under the Mandatory Expungement Statute, the Permissive Expungement Statute vests in the trial court the discretion to either grant or deny a petition for expungement. This grant of discretion necessarily requires the court to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether the circumstances of the case warrant expungement of the conviction. In short, the statute recognizes the possibility that the crime might be too serious to expunge.
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In other words, a trial court, when deciding whether to exercise its discretion, is not prohibited from considering the facts of the incident leading to the conviction—even if the conviction itself doesn’t require proof of those facts.
Because the Permissive Expungement Statute excludes from eligibility persons convicted of certain offenses, but vests in the court discretion to either grant or deny a petition, a trial court should engage in a two-step process when considering a petition for expungement. First, a court must determine whether the conviction is eligible for expungement and the petitioner has met the requirements. I.C. §§ 35-38-9-4(b), -4(e). If the conviction is ineligible, the inquiry ends there. But if the court determines that the conviction is eligible for expungement, it must then collect enough information to determine whether it should grant or deny the petition. In issuing its decision, a trial court may consider a broad array of information, including the nature and circumstances of the crime and the character of the offender. In this case, significant evidence supported Allen’s petition: testimony about his role as a committed father, husband, and provider; letters of recommendation from family, friends, and coworkers; and support from the victims themselves. The trial court, however, didn’t articulate its reasons for denying Allen’s petition for expungement. And because the trial court in this case did not articulate why it denied Allen’s petition, we’re unable to determine what consideration the court gave the evidence presented at the hearing or if it entirely failed to consider the evidence favoring expungement based on a mistaken belief that Allen was ineligible for expungement.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Allen’s petition for expungement and remand with instructions for the court to reconsider its decision consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.