Vaidik, J.
Fourteen days before trial and three years after the omnibus date, the trial court allowed the State, over the defendant Chad P. Hobbs’s objection, to amend the charging information to include three new counts of child molesting. While the new charges involved the same victims, the State added a Class A felony child molesting charge relating to one of the victims for a time period that was not previously charged and a Level 1 felony child-molesting charge relating to the other victim when the prior charging information set forth only a Level 4 felony child-molesting charge for her.
Finding the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to amend the charging information so close to trial without also granting a continuance, we reverse Hobbs’s convictions on the added counts and remand with instructions for the court to vacate those convictions and the corresponding sentences. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
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Hobbs first contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the charging information two weeks before trial.
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This [statute] contemplates that an amendment to a charging information will be made thirty days before the omnibus date, but it “permits late deviations when they do not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.” Howard, 122 N.E.3d at 1017. However, “late deviations are the exception, not the rule.” Id. As our Supreme Court has explained:
A defendant’s substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights. Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges.
Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405-06 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up, emphasis added), reh’g denied. While there is no fixed “minimum period of time which must be allowed by the court in every case” for preparing a defense, the “common scenario [is] two or more months.” Howard, 122 N.E.3d at 1014, 1015 (emphasis added).
First, we note the amendments in this case did not merely clarify details of the existing charges but added entirely new charges. And the amendments were sought nearly three years after the omnibus date and just twenty days before trial with no indication in the record as to why the State waited so long to file the new charges. Notably, the State does not claim plea negotiations were ongoing before or near the time when it filed the second amended charging information. See id. at 1017 (“[W]e nonetheless note that the State had no good cause for having waited until nearly the last minute to move to amend the information. There were no ongoing plea negotiations; there was no pending investigation; and there was no newly discovered evidence.”). The new charges included Class A felony child molesting for M.S. for a time period that was not previously charged and Level 1 felony child molesting for K.H. when the first amended charging information set forth only Level 4 felony child molesting for her.
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We acknowledge Hobbs’s primary defense at trial was M.S. and K.H. were lying, which would apply regardless of the charges. Even assuming his defense remained the same, Hobbs should have been given the opportunity to see if there was anything about the new allegations that supported his theory the victims were lying. Hobbs cannot be faulted for not being able to explain to the trial court how a continuance would assist in his defense, as he did not know what he did not know. An investigation was fundamental. And fourteen days before trial was an insufficient amount of time to conduct one.
Additionally, we think it is too broad a stroke to say if a defendant’s defense remains the same, then the State can add new charges up to the time of trial. Since the defense in child-molesting cases is often that the victim is lying, the only limitation on the State filing additional child-molesting charges would be the trial date itself. This would not be a low hurdle for the State (as the trial court said); it would be no hurdle at all.
As we said in Howard, although there is no minimum time period that trial courts must allow for preparing a defense, the “common scenario [is] two or more months.” Here, fourteen days was not enough time for Hobbs to investigate and prepare for and defend against the new charges. Hobbs’s substantial rights were prejudiced. If the trial court thought the State was entitled to amend the charging information this close to trial, it should have granted Hobbs’s motion to continue. We therefore reverse Hobbs’s convictions on the added counts—Counts I, III, and IV—and remand with instructions for the court to vacate those convictions and the corresponding sentences. See id. at 1018.
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Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.