Vaidik, J.
Michael D. Williams appeals his conviction for theft, which is based on him finding and taking money left at a grocery-store self-checkout station by a previous customer. We reverse, concluding that Williams’s conduct does not constitute theft under Indiana law.
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Williams contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
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Williams argues his conviction must be reversed because the State did not present evidence establishing the identity of the man who left the $83 at the selfcheckout station. The State does not dispute it failed to identify the man. Instead, it asserts it was not required to do so under the theft statute, which provides, “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). According to the State, this language “requires only that the State establish that the property was ‘of another’ and does not require proof of the victim’s name.” Appellee’s Br. p. 8. But as Williams notes, “it is well settled that the name of the owner or possessor of property alleged to have been stolen is a material allegation which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pryor v. State, 889 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying an auto-theft statute that included language similar to the theft statute). We could reverse Williams’s conviction for this reason alone.
But there is a more fundamental problem with Williams’s conviction. Indiana’s theft statute does not criminalize the taking of lost or mislaid property, unlike statutes in many other states.
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If such conduct is to be recriminalized, that is a decision for the legislature. Under the existing theft statute, Williams’s conviction cannot stand.
Reversed.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.