Friedlander, S.J.
R.W. appeals from the entry of a permanent protective order against him, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petition for an order of protection filed by J.W., a woman with whom he was in a romantic relationship, and by finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the legal conclusion to issue the order. We affirm.
R.W. raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the existence of an emergency order of protection issued in Illinois in favor of R.W. require the trial court to transfer J.W.’s Indiana petition for protective order to Illinois under Ind. Code § 34-26-5-6(4) (2003)?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s findings of fact supporting its conclusion of law to enter the order of protection in favor of J.W. and against R.W.?
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J.W. filed her petition for order of protection on September 19, 2019. After R.W.’s request for a continuance of the initial hearing date was granted, he “filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 28, 2019 indicating an existing ex parte Order of Protection had been issued for R.W. and against J.W. on September 11, 2019.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. In his motion, R.W. contended that J.W. ran afoul of the provisions of Indiana Code section 34-26-5-5 (2002). See Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 26.
That section of the Indiana Code provides that,
At a hearing to obtain an order for protection, each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of:
(1) each separate proceeding for an order for protection;
(2) any civil litigation;
(3) each proceeding in a family, domestic relations, or juvenile court; and
(4) each criminal case; involving a party or a child of a party. The information provided under this section must include the case name, the case number, and the county and state in which the proceeding is held, if that information is known by the party.
(Emphasis added).
This challenge requires interpretation of this statute. “Our standard of review for the interpretation of statutes is de novo.” Quinn v. State, 45 N.E.39, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We will assume for the sake of argument that R.W.’s objection was timely despite his prior motion for continuance. Although it is correct that J.W.’s petition indicates “NA” in the section of the petition asking for information regarding any other cases which she and R.W. had pending, see Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 16, the statute clearly states that at a hearing, the parties have a continuing duty to inform the court. R.W.’s motion informed the court, and the matter was brought to the court’s attention at the hearing. Indeed, the record is not clear about whether J.W. had yet received service of the order granting R.W.’s Illinois emergency order of protection after the Porter County Sheriff received it on September 13, 2019, which was prior to the filing of her petition.
Additionally, the existence of the Illinois proceeding initiated by R.W. between the two did not preclude J.W. from seeking her own order of protection in Indiana where she lived. See N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (fact that husband was subject to no-contact order as to wife did not prohibit wife from seeking protection order against husband). Indiana Code subsections 34-26-5-6 (2) and (3) (2003) explicitly provide that “a petitioner is not barred from seeking an order because of another pending proceeding” and that “[a] court may not delay granting relief because another pending action exists between the petitioner and the respondent.”
R.W. further contends that,
The Porter Superior Court erred by failing to transfer J.W.’s Petition to the Illinois Circuit Court where an ex parte Order of Protection had already been issued prior to the Porter Superior Court’s hearing on extending J.W.’s ex parte Order of Protection.
Appellant’s Br. p. 9. R.W. cites Indiana Code section 34-26-5-6(4) in support of his argument.
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Of the three reported cases analyzing this statute, only one, Sims v. Lopez, 885 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), involves the issue of transfer between courts. See also S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214 (Ind. 2020) and N.E., 130 N.E.3d 102. In Sims, the former wife’s Lake County ex parte petition should have been transferred to either St. Joseph County or LaPorte County where the former husband’s civil actions against her or her current husband were pending. Thus, it is apparent that in this subsection of the statute, the Indiana legislature intended to consolidate Indiana actions between or involving these particular parties and provided for the transfer of actions between Indiana courts to meet that end. See Sims, 885 N.E.2d at 17. This conclusion finds further support in the legislature’s choice of specific language referring to actions in other states in another section. See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-5 (continuing duty to notify court of case name, number, county and state involving pending litigation between parties).
J.W., a Porter County resident, properly filed her petition with the trial court because Indiana Code section 34-26-5-4 (2002) gives a court of record jurisdiction to issue a civil order for protection in the county in which the petitioner currently or temporarily resides. Thus, the trial court correctly denied R.W.’s motion to dismiss the petition and correctly retained jurisdiction over the matter instead of transferring it to Illinois.
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For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to transfer J.W.’s petition to Illinois, and did not err by finding and concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support issuing a permanent order of protection in favor of J.W.
Judgment affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Crone, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Crone, Judge, concurring.
I agree with the affirmance of the protective order against Rafer Weigel, but I write separately because I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ decision to refer to Weigel by his initials instead of his name.
No statute, court rule, or court policy entitles Weigel to anonymity. In fact, pursuant to the Rules on Access to Court Records adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court, Weigel’s name is presumptively accessible to the public…
As described in lurid detail above, Weigel threatened and publicly humiliated J.W., who sought and obtained a protective order against him. Weigel has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that order. If we had ruled in his favor, he could have petitioned to expunge all records relating to the protective order pursuant to Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-7.5. But since we have affirmed the trial court’s determination that Weigel harassed J.W., I can think of no principled reason why this Court should shield his identity from the public. Indeed, naming the perpetrator of such depraved acts could only contribute to public safety, promote governmental transparency and accountability (by this Court and by any law enforcement agency that might have occasion to enforce the protective order, respectively), and prevent future harassment of J.W. and others.