Crone, J.
Randolf S. Sargent appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for sentence modification. The trial court determined that it did not have statutory authority to consider the merits of Sargent’s motion. We disagree and therefore reverse and remand.
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The trial court concluded that it had no authority to consider the merits of Sargent’s current petition for modification because the court determined that he had already filed two such petitions during his consecutive period of incarceration. Accordingly, the question is whether Sargent’s 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP constituted a motion for sentence modification pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-18-1-17. We think not.
The PIP is a project with Indiana Court Systems, through which the DOC “works in collaboration with Judges who can sentence chemically addicted offenders and document that they will ‘consider a sentence modification’ should the offender successfully complete [a DOC] Therapeutic community.”… This Court has explained that a trial court’s limited role in relation to purposeful incarceration is simply to identify which defendants should be flagged as individuals most likely to benefit from participation in the program.
In his 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP, Sargent was not requesting a reduction or suspension of his sentence. He was essentially requesting that the trial court amend its original sentencing order and/or abstract of judgment and recommend him for participation in programming offered by the DOC that he believed he would benefit from during his incarceration. Another panel of this Court, albeit under different factual circumstances, has rejected the argument that such a request constitutes a request for sentence modification. Hogan, 95 N.E.3d at 184 n.4. Indeed, it is clear that while participation in the PIP may lead to a subsequent sentence modification, the request for a participation recommendation is not, in itself, a request for modification. We conclude that Sargent’s 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP did not constitute a motion for sentence modification pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-18-1-17.
Because Sargent has only made one prior motion for sentence modification, the trial court erred when it concluded that it lacked the statutory authority to consider the merits of Sargent’s current motion. Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.