Bailey, J.
Case Summary
H.H. requested a two-year protective order against her ex-husband, S.H., pursuant to the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act, Indiana Code Section 34- 26-5-1, et. seq. (“the Act”). H.H. was granted a one-year protective order and appeals to challenge the duration. [Footnote omitted.] We affirm.
….
H.H. directs our attention to Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(f), which provides in relevant part: “An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing, or a modification of an order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing, is effective for two (2) years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered by the court.” She argues that a petitioner who establishes grounds for relief is entitled to a two-year protective order unless the trial court enters a specific finding to support a deviation.
….
The duration of a protective order issued under the Act is “two years after the date of issuance unless another date is ordered by the court.” I.C. § 34-26-5- 9(f). The broad language chosen by the Legislature – “unless another date is ordered” – permits the selection of a different term within the sole discretion of the court. The court, having exercised the role of factfinder in assessing the existence of violence or a threat, is in the best position to fashion relief to bring about cessation of the violence or a threat. We acknowledge that, because a protective order is in the nature of an injunction, “in granting a protective order the trial court must sua sponte make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon.” Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). But when the trial court has made such findings, the statutory language under review imposes no additional obligation to enter a particular finding to support a non-standard duration. The necessity of language supporting a deviation is something that the statute “does not say” and we will not engraft such a requirement. ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1195
That said, we also look to what the statutory language “does say.” Id. We will not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result. Id. at 1196. Here, the two-year default duration was selected by the Legislature in furtherance of the purposes of the Act and should not be considered meaningless. Although the statutory scheme confers broad discretion on the trial court, the breadth of this discretion does not include a blanket substitution of “policy” for legislative enactment.
H.H. asks that we remand the instant matter for further proceedings, because the relief accorded her was potentially affected by a one-year “policy” ostensibly adopted by the trial court. However, we conclude that the facts and circumstances present in this case are consistent with a one-year term of civil protection. That is, at the time of the hearing, S.H. was in custody awaiting deportation to Lebanon. As the potential for S.H. to contact H.H. is greatly restricted, we discern no necessity for remand.
Conclusion
Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(f) does not require that the trial court make a particularized finding to support a deviation from the stated two-year term. In issuing a protective order, the trial court may exercise discretion in selecting an appropriate term but may not substitute a policy in place of legislation.
Affirmed. Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur