Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, W.M. (Father), the biological father of J.K.N.M., Z.L.L.M., and M.J.R.M. (collectively, Children), appeals the trial court’s Orders, granting the petition for adoption of the Children by H.T. (Adoptive Mother).
We remand.
ISSUE
Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as the following: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Adoptive Mother’s petition for adoption.
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Father contends that the trial court erred in granting Adoptive Mother’s petition to adopt the Children. He argues that he did not give his consent to the adoptions and that they should be set aside.
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The granting of a petition for adoption is a multi-step process. Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(a) lists the prerequisites to granting a petition, including that “the adoption requested is in the best interest of the child” and “proper consent, if consent is necessary, has been given.” If the requirements listed in the statute are met, “the court shall grant the petition for adoption and enter an adoption decree.” Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1(a)
Generally, the first step in the process is determining whether the biological parent’s consent to the adoption is required. Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8 addresses when consent is not required and provides, in relevant part:
(a) Consent to adoption, which may be required under Section 1 of this chapter, is not required from any of the following: * * *
(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent: (A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or (B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.
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(11) A parent if: (A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; and (B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parent’s consent.
The record shows that the last time Father communicated with the Children was in 2015. Adoptive Mother filed her petition to adopt the Children in 2019. Though the record contains evidence demonstrating that Father failed to communicate with the Children for more than a year which could support a conclusion that Father’s consent was not required, the adoption Orders in this case fail to explicitly reference that pertinent fact and only denotes the fact that Adoptive Mother is a fit parent and that it would be in the Children’s best interest to be adopted.
Even assuming that the trial court’s discussion that Adoptive Mother was a fit parent was the trial court’s way of presumably referencing Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(11), which provides another path for dispensing with consent, the trial court failed to make the specific findings required by that provision, namely, that (1) Father is unfit to be a parent and (2) “the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parent’s consent.” Because the adoption Orders failed to specify under which of the multiple exceptions provided by Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a) the trial court was dispensing with Father’s consent to the adoption, we remand this case with instructions for the trial court to enter such a specific findings.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court failed to make any findings that would support dispensing with Father’s consent, we remand and retain jurisdiction to the trial court for further findings as required by statute. The judgment of the trial court shall be filed with this court within 30 days from the issuance of this opinion.
Remanded.
May, J. and Altice, J. concur