Brown, J.
Harjinder Singh appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Gurdwara Hargobind Sahib Ji Corporation (“Gurdwara Hargobind”).[Footnote omitted.] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Harjinder argues that Gurdwara Hargobind had a duty, which arose from the foreseeability of his injury, to take reasonable precautions to protect him from injury at the hands of others at the temple. He asserts reasonable inferences support the conclusion that Gurdwara Hargobind had reason to know a violent reaction to the shoving incident would spark a widespread altercation likely resulting in injury, and that the knowledge and actions of the president of the Executive Committee are imputed to Gurdwara Hargobind. He further argues that Gurdwara Hargobind assumed a duty to everyone who attended to worship through the affirmative act of arranging for extra security to be on-site and that the court’s related findings are contrary to the evidence.
Gurdwara Hargobind maintains it had no warning that a physical attack was imminent at the time of the incident, that the occurrence of a verbal altercation the weekend before was immaterial, and that Harjinder’s proposed interpretation of the duty would make premises owners the insurers of their invitees. It further argues that, even if this Court were to determine there was a duty owed or assumed, it did not breach the duty as it took all reasonable measures on April 15, 2018, to provide a safe environment for its worshippers.
In maintaining that the trial court correctly determined it did not owe or assume any duty to protect Harjinder from an unforeseeable physical altercation at the temple on April 15, 2018, Gurdwara Hargobind points to Cavanaugh’s, 140 N.E.3d 837 (Ind. 2020), the Indiana Supreme Court’s latest jurisprudence on the issue. In concluding that the duty of a landowner to protect the plaintiff did not extend to an unforeseeable criminal attack, the Court stated…
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In a separate opinion in which Justice David joined, Justice Goff dissented and disagreed with adding new requirements to the foreseeability inquiry that “elevat[ed] the standard to impose a duty.” Cavanaugh’s, 140 N.E.3d at 844 (Goff, J., dissenting). He further observed that the “majority also relie[d] on the particular facts of this case” including “the lack of tension in the bar, noting that ‘for hours before the fracas, [the plaintiff] and his friend socialized with bartenders and had no animosity with any other customers.’” Id. at 846 (quoting majority op. at 843). Accordingly, it appears that, in practice, an examination of particular facts is necessary to fully resolve the question of duty at this stage and to properly apply Cavanaugh’s required “foreseeability as a component of duty” analysis. [Footnote omitted.] See 140 N.E.3d at 844 (majority op.).
Here, the designated evidence reveals that, on the weekend prior to the April 15th incident, shouting in the main building disrupted the selection of a new Executive Committee, that the selection process was relocated, that law enforcement was called, and that, when “around eight officers came in,” everybody was asked to leave. Appellant’s Appendix Volume III at 27. After the election, the Committee took steps to avoid further disturbances, including not announcing the committee selection, hiring extra security, and issuing membership termination letters for twelve members.
On the day Harjinder asserts Amardeep, a Gurdwara Hargobind board member, stabbed him, more security guards were present on the premises than on the election Saturday. Signs were posted in the gurdwara that restricted photos or videos because of bad publicity and people becoming argumentative. That day, people carried weapons, which the designated evidence reveals was a normal practice, and carried weapons inside the place of worship, which Harjinder’s designated evidence indicated “was not normally done.” Id. at 120. Further, members of the board and committee, including Satnam, the president of the Gurdwara Hargobind committee, terminated the memberships of twelve individuals by letter and, in anticipation that certain individuals had not received the notice, hired a Marion County Sheriff’s deputy to hand out the letter the day of the incident and to prevent entrance to the premises. Two of the four designated video recordings, when viewed together, contain footage of Satnam and an entourage escorting Nijjar through the temple’s prayer room, as well as of an individual wielding a spear. See Exhibit A-7, “Escort Out” clip at 0:21, “Swinging the Spear” clip at 0:01-0:08; Appellant’s Appendix Volume III at 43. Satnam can be seen shoving Nijjar, who turns around and confronts him. Moments afterwards, individuals already inside the prayer hall surround Satnam, Nijjar, and the escort group, other individuals enter the room, a large crowd forms, and several physical skirmishes break out across the prayer hall. It is during this time that the stabbing in question occurs. We note that unlike in Cavanaugh’s, which involved third parties, i.e., a bar patron fighting with another departing bar patron in the parking lot, the present case involves Satnam, the president of the Gurdwara Hargobind committee, shoving Nijjar, which happened seconds before the larger fracas began when Harjinder was allegedly stabbed by a board member.
On these facts, we find that Gurdwara Hargobind had notice of present and specific circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to recognize the risk of an imminent criminal act, and had reason to recognize the probability or likelihood of looming harm on a special day of celebration at which its change in leadership was to be announced and the new Board of Directors was to take charge.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Gurdwara Hargobind and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.