Altice, J.
The State appeals from the trial court’s grant of Michael Stone’s motion to suppress evidence found following the execution of a search warrant at his residence. The trial court determined that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the officers executing the warrant did not rely on the warrant in good faith.
We reverse and remand.
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Where a warrant is sought based on hearsay information, the probable cause affidavit (or testimony, as in this case) must either: (1) contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished; or (2) contain information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953-54 (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(b) and I.C. § 31-35-5-8(a)(1)). The trustworthiness of hearsay in this context can be established in a number of ways, including where: (1) the informant has given correct information in the past, (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant’s statements, (3) some basis for the informant’s knowledge is demonstrated, or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activity by the suspect that is not ordinarily easily predicted. Id. at 954. This list is not exclusive and, depending on the facts, other considerations may come into play. Id. Relevant here, an informant’s declaration against penal interest can furnish sufficient basis for establishing the informant’s credibility. See id.; Shipman, 987 N.E.2d at 1127.
In Spillers, our Supreme Court considered whether the informant’s statement qualified as one against penal interest. Craib, the informant, had been caught by police with more than three grams of cocaine, which was found during the execution of a search warrant at his home. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 956. After his arrest, Craib informed the detectives that Spillers was his drug source and that he had obtained cocaine from Spillers more than ten times over the last few months, most recently that same day. Craib also provided Spiller’s address and the make and model of his car, which were facts readily available to the general public.
The Court observed that statements by informants have qualified as against penal interest and been found sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant in cases where:
the informant either volunteered inculpatory information after being arrested for a minor offense or for an offense only indirectly related to the information given to police, or the informant was not under arrest at all and voluntarily gave police inculpatory information that the police would not otherwise have necessarily known or suspected.
Id. at 955. After noting several such cases, the Court summarized, “[t]he underlying thread binding these cases together is that an informant, after arrest or confrontation by police, admitted committing criminal offenses under circumstances in which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone undetected.” Id. at 956. Indeed, the Court recognized, people do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police by their own admissions and, thus, such admissions carry an indicia of credibility sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search. Id.
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Because the decision to reveal his source did not subject him to any additional criminal liability, the Court concluded that “under the circumstances Craib’s declarations were not against his penal interest therefore did not demonstrate that Craib was a credible source of information.” Id. at 956-57.
Similarly, in the case at hand, the trial court found that Putnam’s statements were not declarations against penal interest. We cannot agree, as the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable. Here, Putnam was not under arrest when he spoke with Detective Nies and the evidence against him was slim – far from being caught red handed. Two victims had listed Putnam as a possible suspect in the separate thefts of firearms because he was a friend who had access to each home. Further, the Ruger had been recovered shortly after it went missing in the possession of another individual – Waltz, who, while in jail, named Putnam as the source of the firearm. This was the only actual evidence linking Putnam to the theft of the Ruger, and no evidence linked him to the theft of the Sig Sauer, which had occurred about two months earlier.
During the interview with Detective Nies, Putnam admitted to burglarizing both residences and stealing the firearms, and he provided incriminating details not known by police, including describing how he gained entrance to each residence. Putnam also indicated that he transferred the Ruger to Waltz in exchange for debt forgiveness and cash, which was the same account given by Waltz. With regard to the Sig Sauer, Putnam reported that he sold the stolen firearm to Stone in exchange for $400.
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Nothing about Putnam’s admissions indicates that he was attempting to shift blame, downplay his role in the offenses, or curry favor with the police. Rather, we find his statements to be true declarations against his penal interest, subjecting him to criminal liability and demonstrating that he was a credible source of information. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress based on Spillers.
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In sum, we find that a reasonably prudent person could make a practical, common-sense determination, given all the circumstances set forth in Detective Nies’s testimony, that there was a fair probability the stolen Sig Sauer would be found at Stone’s home. Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J. and Crone, J., concur.