Tavitas, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Jarrel Ellis’ motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a compliance check of Ellis’ residence while Ellis was serving a community corrections sentence. We reverse and remand.
The State raises one issue for our review, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred by granting Ellis’ motion to suppress.
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The issue for our determination is not whether there was reasonable suspicion to search Ellis’ home, but only whether, based upon the terms of the Community Corrections Contract, Ellis waived his right to challenge the search. The trial court held that, notwithstanding the Contract, Community Corrections lacked reasonable suspicion to search Ellis’ home.
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After Vanderkolk [v. State, 32 N.E.3d 775 (Ind. 2015)], our Court decided Hodges v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), which we find persuasive. In Hodges, the defendant signed the following acknowledgement of the terms of his probation: “You waive your right against search and seizure, and shall permit a Probation Officer, or any law enforcement officer acting on a Probation Officer’s behalf, to search your person, residence, motor vehicle, or any location where your personal properly may be found, to insure compliance with probation.” Hodges, 54 N.E.2d at 1057. Officers then received several tips that Hodges was manufacturing methamphetamine. Subsequently, a warrantless search of Hodges’ garage yielded a weapon, a white crystal-like substance, and other items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Accordingly, the State charged Hodges with various drug offenses. Hodges filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence, which the trial court denied.
On appeal, Hodges argued that the search was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We noted: “The crux of the Vanderkolk holding is that a probation search need not be supported by reasonable suspicion and may be predicated solely upon a valid search condition contained in the conditions of probation. Thus, a probationer’s argument that a probation search lacked reasonable suspicion is unequivocally no longer a legitimate objection . . . .” Id. at 1059.
In analyzing the terms of Hodges’ probation, our Court held that the language, “albeit somewhat minimal, was sufficient to constitute a clearly expressed search condition, as it specifically advised Hodges that he was waiving his ‘right against search and seizure.’” Id. at 1061. Our Court further held:
Although Hodges posits that this mere reference to the right against search and seizure did not clearly express to him exactly what constitutional protections he was giving up when consenting to the rules of probation, we agree with the State that it would make little sense to require a boilerplate reference to our federal or state constitutions in order for the search condition to be considered valid. In light of our supreme court’s expansive holding in Vanderkolk, and its observation that “the willingness of judicial officers to grant conditional release is likely to be impaired if supervision is uncertain or difficult,” 32 N.E.3d at 779, we think that the language used here was within constitutional parameters.
Id.
Here, pursuant to Ellis’ home detention placement, he agreed to the following:
You waive your right against search and seizure, and shall permit MCCC staff, or any law enforcement officer acting on MCCC’s behalf, to search your person, residence, motor vehicle, or any location where your personal property may be found, to insure compliance with the requirements of community corrections.
State’s Ex. 2. This language is almost identical to the waiver provision in Hodges. As in Hodges, we conclude that this language was sufficient to waive Ellis’ rights against search and seizure and to authorize a suspicionless search. Accordingly, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to search Ellis’ residence.
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Our Supreme Court has held that community corrections participants “who have consented or been clearly informed that the conditions of their . . . community corrections program unambiguously authorize warrantless and suspicionless searches may thereafter be subject to such searches during the period of their . . . community corrections status.” Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d at 779 (emphasis added). As in Hodges, Ellis’ Community Corrections Contract unambiguously authorized warrantless and suspicionless searches, without limitation. Accordingly, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to search Ellis’ residence. The trial court’s decision to grant Ellis’ motion to suppress was erroneous.
Conclusion
The trial court improperly granted Ellis’ motion to suppress. We reverse and remand to the trial court to enter an order consistent with our opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.