Sharpnack, S.J.
Following a jury trial, Patrick Elliott was convicted of murder, a felony, and false informing as a Class A misdemeanor. He then admitted to the sentencing enhancement of using a firearm to commit the murder. The trial court sentenced Elliott to an aggregate term of seventy-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. He appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.
Elliott presents two issues for our review, which we restate as: 1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Elliott’s pastor in contravention of the clergymen privilege; and 2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.
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Elliott argues that the trial court improperly permitted Pastor Evans to testify to the incriminating statement that Elliot made to the pastor. Pastor Evans visited Elliott three times while Elliott was in jail awaiting trial. During the second visit, Elliott told the pastor that he planted the knife at the scene of the shooting. According to Elliott, the incriminating statement he made to his pastor was protected by the clergymen’s privilege under Indiana Code section 34-46-3- 1(3)(A) and (B) (1998), and the State should not have been allowed to introduce the statement from the pastor during Elliott’s trial.
The State argues initially that the pastor, “not Elliott, held the clergymen privilege[,]” and “the privilege is [the clergyman’s] alone to exercise or waive.” Appellee’s Br. pp. 14, 15. We reject that argument.
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Not all statements are protected, only those that qualify under the statute. If, as the State argues, the privilege to prevent use of a statement belongs only to the clergyman, there is no sure protection for a defendant. The issue here is not whether the pastor is willing to testify, but whether the incriminating statement Elliott made to him is a confession or admission made in the course of discipline under Subsection 34-46-3-1(A), or a confidential communication under Subsection (B), such that the pastor should not have been permitted to testify to the statement over Elliott’s objection.
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Admission Made to Clergyman in Course of Discipline
Elliott first argues that Pastor Evans should not have been allowed to testify to the incriminating statement because the statement was an admission made to his pastor, a clergyman, “in the course of discipline enjoined by” his pastor’s church. Ind. Code § 34-46-3-1(3)(A). Elliott maintains that Pastor Evans delivered discipline to him while he was in jail and that the “discipline sought that Elliott own up to his sins and repent.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21. According to Elliott, “the pastor told [him] that he needed to repent[, and] Elliott repented.” Id. at 23.
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In Bonham v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1994), a case we find instructive, the defendant was accused of killing his acquaintance’s mother. A pastor of a church where Bonham’s parents were members had visited Bonham in jail. During the visit, Bonham told the pastor how he had killed the victim. Bonham’s counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that it was a privileged communication; however, the trial court overruled the motion and allowed the pastor to testify. Bonham appealed and our supreme court noted that the pastor testified that “there was no course of discipline in his church that required a formal confession of sins.” 644 N.E.2d at 1225. 4 Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling Bonham’s motion to suppress and his counsel’s objection to the pastor’s testimony. Id.
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Although the discipline letter stated that Elliott’s privileges as a member of the church were suspended, that he had “sinned grievously” and needed to repent, and that the church was awaiting a response from him of “softening,” “complete honesty,” and “holiness[,]” the pastor testified that the Reformed Presbyterian Church does not recognize a formal confession. Ex., Def.’s Ex. B, p. 219. When asked if the church recognizes privileged communications between the pastor and a church member, the pastor explained that the church recognizes “the need for discretion but not confidentiality.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 95. When asked if a member must make a formal confession to the pastor in order to “get right with God[,] Pastor Evans answered, “Not a formal confession[,] no.” Id.
Based upon the foregoing, and in light of …Bonham, we conclude that Elliott’s statement to Pastor Evans was not made “in the course of discipline enjoined by” Pastor Evans’ church. See Ind. Code § 34-46-3- 1(3)(A). Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the pastor’s testimony.
Confidential Communication Made to a Clergyman
Elliott next argues that the incriminating statement he made to Pastor Evans was protected under Subsection (B) of Indiana Code section 34-46-3-1(3) because the statement was a “confidential communication made to a clergyman in the clergyman’s professional character as a spiritual adviser or counselor.” Ind. Code § 34-46-3-1(3)(B). We disagree.
At trial, Pastor Evans testified that the first time he met with Elliott at the jail, he did so as his pastor to provide pastoral care. However, when Pastor Evans visited Elliott the second time, the pastor presented Elliott with the discipline letter from the church. The letter stated that Elliott’s church privileges had been suspended; he needed to repent; and the church was awaiting a response from him. Elliott then disclosed to the pastor that he had lied to the pastor and the church, in that, he had planted the knife at the scene of the shooting.
We find nothing in this conversation between the pastor and Elliott, and Elliott points us to no evidence, that indicates that Elliott expected any confidentiality on the pastor’s part or that Elliott was seeking spiritual advice or counseling from Pastor Evans in the pastor’s professional character. See, e.g., Mullins, 721 N.E.2d at 338 n.4 (“nothing in the conversation between [the priest] and Mullins indicates that Mullins expected any confidentiality or that he was seeking advice or counseling from [the priest] in his priestly capacity.”). Furthermore, Pastor Evans testified that confession was not part of the Reformed Presbyterian Church’s discipline; the church recognized the need for discretion but not confidentiality; and if a member of the church reported a crime to him, he believed it was his responsibility to report the crime to the authorities. Based on the foregoing, we find that the incriminating statement Elliott made to his pastor was not protected under Indiana Code section 34-46- 3-1(3)(B). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the pastor to testify over Elliott’s objection.
Even if the trial court had erred in admitting the pastor’s testimony, the error would not require reversal.
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Here, additional independent evidence of the planting of the knife was presented during Elliott’s trial. For example, when the police interviewed Elliott and played the recording of the shooting for him, Elliott admitted that he had planted a knife after shooting his wife. When Elliott testified in his own defense, he admitted that he told the police that he planted the knife. Even if the trial court had erred in allowing Pastor Evans to testify, any error in the admission of the testimony did not affect Elliott’s substantial rights because the evidence was cumulative and therefore was harmless.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Pastor Evans’ testimony regarding Elliott’s admission that he planted the knife at the scene of the shooting and that Elliott’s seventy-five year aggregate sentence was not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.