Tavitas, J.
James Combs appeals his convictions for Counts I, II, and III, possession of narcotic drugs, Level 3 felonies; Count V, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Count VI, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor; Count VII, operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body, a Class C misdemeanor; Count VIII, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count IX, public intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Combs raises six issues on appeal; however, we consolidate and restate the issues as follows: I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to replace a juror with an alternate juror. III. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct. IV. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Combs’ convictions.
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Combs argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police searched his vehicle without a warrant.
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The State argues that the officers lawfully viewed Combs’ van without conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the seizure of Combs’ van was valid under the open view doctrine as evidence of a crime. This argument diverges from the trial court’s order, which allowed seizure of the vehicle under the plain view doctrine rather than the open view doctrine.
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We do not find the open view or plain view doctrines to be operable here. It is clear from the record that the towing and impound search of the vehicle were merely pretextual means by which officers could search the vehicle to find incriminating evidence.
Witnesses reported to officers that Combs looked for something under his seat, and Officer Koontz asked to search the vehicle early in his investigation. Combs declined to consent. The vehicle was parked in Combs’ driveway, and officers had time to procure a warrant before searching the vehicle, but they declined to do so due to the inconvenience. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lieutenant Mount initially testified that the officers seized the vehicle as evidence of a crime. Photographs of the vehicle, however, were not admitted into evidence at trial, and the record reveals that the vehicle was returned to Combs’ wife two days after it was towed from Combs’ driveway.
Combs admitted that he was going to contact law enforcement regarding the accident; therefore, it is not clear why the officers needed the van to solve the crime. The State presented no evidence that the van would “prove useful in solving” the investigations into the charges of leaving the scene of an accident or driving while intoxicated. Wilkinson, 70 N.E.3d at 402. The damage was on the outside of the vehicle and photographs of the vehicle could have preserved the evidence. Nothing in the record indicates that the officers had probable cause to believe the van contained evidence that was related to the offenses being investigated.
The record supports the finding that the officers’ inventory search was a pretext for searching Combs’ van…Here, we find indicia of pretext to search Combs’ vehicle for incriminating evidence; accordingly, the search was unreasonable. We conclude that the search of Combs’ vehicle was impermissible under the open view and plain view doctrines and the Fourth Amendment.
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Here, the discovery of the evidence obtained from the vehicle was a direct result of the pretextual and illegal search of Combs’ van. There is also no indication that the evidence from the van could have been obtained in another way. Moreover, the connection between the search and the evidence is not attenuated to such a point that we could conclude it is no longer tainted.
The officers violated Combs’ Fourth Amendment rights by searching his vehicle without a warrant, and the evidence obtained from the search was fruit of the poisonous tree. Specifically, the pills found in Combs’ vehicle should not have been admitted at trial. Those pills formed the basis for Combs’ convictions for Counts I, II, and III. Accordingly, we reverse Combs’ convictions for Counts I, II, and III, and we remand for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Conclusion
The warrantless search of Combs’ vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, evidence found as a result of the illegal search should have been excluded. Accordingly, we reverse Combs’ convictions for Counts I, II, and III, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of Combs’ chemical blood test or in failing to replace a juror with the alternate juror. The deputy prosecutor did not commit misconduct, and the evidence was sufficient to convict Combs of leaving the scene of an accident and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.