Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
During her marriage to Margarito Guzman (“Husband”), Wendy Sonora Hernandez (“Mother”) gave birth to J.G. (“Child”). Nearly five years after Child’s birth, the State filed a paternity action as Child’s next friend in which the State sought to establish paternity in Fredy Sanchez Cortez (“Putative Father”). Mother moved to dismiss the State’s petition, which motion the trial court converted to a motion for summary judgment. After a fact-finding hearing, the court denied Mother’s motion and found Putative Father to be Child’s biological father.
Mother and Husband appeal and raise three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Husband as a party to the proceeding after it had found Putative Father to be Child’s biological father.
2. Whether the trial court denied Mother a reasonable opportunity to present materials relevant to her motion for summary judgment.
3. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the State’s petition was properly filed even though it filed the petition more than two years after Child’s birth and Putative Father had not registered with the putative father registry
We affirm.
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Mother first contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for summary judgment because the State had not timely filed its paternity petition.6 Specifically, Mother asserts that a paternity petition must be filed not later than two years after a child is born. And because the State did not file its petition until Child was almost five years old, Mother maintains that the State filed its petition outside the two-year statute of limitations.
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Mother acknowledges that that exception allows a prosecuting attorney to file a paternity petition more than two years after a child’s birth. However, Mother directs us to Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(7), which provides that a prosecuting attorney can only file a paternity petition “[i]f the paternity of a child has not been established[.]” Based on that statute, Mother asserts that, here, paternity was established for Child when Child was born during her marriage to Husband.
In support of her position, Mother relies on Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-1(1). But that statute states that a man is “presumed to be” a child’s father if the child is born while the man is married to the child’s mother. That is, Mother has equated the term “presumed” as used in Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-1(1) with the term “established” as used in Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(7). But we “presume the legislature deliberately used a different term because it intended to communicate a different meaning.” In re Adoption of B.C.H., 22 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2014). Had the legislature intended for paternity of a child to be “established” simply because of a husband’s marriage to the child’s mother, it could have said so. But it did not. Rather, it explicitly provided that a husband’s marriage only creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity. See I.C. § 31-14-7-1(1).
Indeed, it is well settled that the fact that a child was born while his mother was married “does not establish that the child was born during wedlock.” K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 402 (Ind. 1996) (emphasis added). And our Supreme Court has observed that the presumption of fatherhood created by Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-1(1) “is not conclusive[.]” Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1990). On the contrary, that presumption of paternity “can be rebutted[.]” T.M. v. L.D. (In re I.J.), 39 N.E.3d 1184, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
Because the presumption of paternity that arises when a man is married to a child’s mother is not conclusive and can be overcome, we hold that the paternity of a child has not been established simply by virtue of the marriage. Here, even though Husband was presumed to be Child’s father, his paternity had not been established. And because the paternity of Child had not been established, the prosecuting attorney was authorized to file the paternity petition. See I.C. § 31-14-4-1(7)(B).
In any event, while not discussed by Mother or Putative Father, we note that Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-2(a) provides that a person less than eighteen years of age “may file a petition if the person is competent except for the person’s age. A person who is otherwise incompetent can file a petition through the person’s . . . next friend.” And a child may file a paternity petition “at any time before the child reaches twenty (20) years of age.” I.C. § 31-14-5- 2(b). Here, the prosecuting attorney filed the petition on behalf of Child as Child’s next friend. 8 Because the prosecuting attorney was filing on behalf of Child, he was authorized to file the petition at any time before Child turned twenty years old. As Child was less than five years old at the time the State filed its petition, the petition was timely. The trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the State’s petition was untimely.
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Conclusion
In sum, we hold that Mother and Husband have failed to meet their burden on appeal to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion when it dismissed Husband as a party to the action. We further hold that Mother has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to provide her with explicit notice of its intent to treat her motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. And we hold that the State timely filed its paternity petition and that Putative Father was not required to register with the putative father registry before the State could file its petition. As such, the trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s motion for summary judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur