Per curiam
In Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), and Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004), we held that a defendant who pleads guilty may waive the right to appellate review of his or her sentence only if this waiver is knowing and voluntary. Today we reaffirm the critical role of the trial court in safeguarding the validity of such waivers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand to allow Brandon L. Johnson to pursue a belated direct appeal of his 12-year sentence.
The trial court denied Johnson’s request to file a belated notice of appeal. This decision was affirmed on appeal. Johnson v. State, 140 N.E.3d 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), vacated. The Court of Appeals “f[ou]nd it concerning” that the plea agreement purported to waive Johnson’s right to seek post-conviction relief, a “patently void and unenforceable term” that “our courts have held [invalid] for almost thirty years.” Id. at 861, fn. 6. It also “strongly recommend[ed]” that the county prosecutor’s office “update its outdated plea agreement form so that it more clearly explains the effect of the waiver of the right to appeal… .” Id. at 863, fn. 9. But ultimately, the opinion held, the fact that Johnson accepted the plea agreement was sufficient for the trial court to find a valid waiver of his right to appeal, although “in other cases in which our courts have upheld a waiver-of-appeal provision in a plea agreement, the provision was more explicit about the waiver of the right to appeal the sentence.” Id. at 862.
We share the Court of Appeals’ concern about the vagueness of the waiver provision at issue here. In Collins, we held that a defendant who pleads guilty remains entitled to appeal the merits of a trial court’s sentencing decision. 817 N.E.2d at 231. Four years later, in Creech, we cautioned that defendants may waive this right of appeal only if this waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily, and found valid waiver where Creech’s plea agreement specifically waived his “right to appeal [his] sentence[.]” 887 N.E.2d at 74-75.
Under these circumstances, we find the general waiver of Johnson’s “right to appeal,” particularly when contained in the same sentence as an unenforceable waiver of post-conviction relief, insufficiently explicit to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Johnson’s right to appeal his sentence. We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to grant Johnson’s motion for permission to file a belated notice of appeal.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents, and would expressly adopt the court of appeals’ opinion.