Altice, J.
Case Summary
Jane Doe and R.A.C. (collectively, Petitioners) each filed a petition with the trial court to change their legal name pursuant to Ind. Code chapter 34-28-2. In each case, the trial court found that the petition was made in good faith and not for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. The court indicated that it could easily grant the petitions if only Petitioners were United States citizens. Believing it was constrained by I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a)(5), however, the trial court denied the petitions.
In this consolidated appeal, Petitioners argue that the trial court erred when it interpreted I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a)(5) to require proof of citizenship as a prerequisite to obtaining a name change. They direct us to In re Resnover, 979 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), in which another panel of this court held that the language of subsection 2.5(a) carries directory, rather than mandatory, intent and, thus, where a document on the statutory list “cannot be submitted to the court, the petitioner is relieved from the necessity to produce the documents.” Id. at 676. Further, Petitioners contend that the trial court’s interpretation renders the statute unconstitutional on several grounds, including equal protection.
The State, upon our invitation, intervened in this appeal to address the constitutionality of I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a)(5), which the State argues unambiguously requires proof of United States citizenship. While the State contends that the statute is facially valid, it concedes that as a matter of equal protection, “the citizenship requirement is unconstitutional as applied to these Petitioners because heightened scrutiny applies to legal permanent residents and childhood arrivals.” Appellee’s Brief at 12.
Constitutional issues abound here but, counseled by the doctrine of judicial restraint, we do not reach them. Consistent with caselaw and the framework of the name change statutes, we do not interpret I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a)(5) to require that a petitioner be a United States citizen in order to obtain a statutory name change.
We reverse and remand.
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…At first blush, the statute appears to require proof of United States citizenship before a name change may be granted. Such an interpretation, however, not only leads to constitutional problems – as acknowledged by the State – but is counter to the history of liberally allowing nonfraudulent name changes in Indiana and the overall framework of the name change statutes.
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We agree with Petitioners that had the legislature intended to prohibit a third class of natural persons from being able to petition for a name change – namely, those who are not United States citizens – the above provisions make clear that the exception would be listed in section 1.5 of the chapter. Indeed, under the well-established doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when items are specified or enumerated in a statute then, by implication, other items not so specified or enumerated are excluded. See A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 614 (Ind. 2018); Campbell v. Eary, 132 N.E.3d 413, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Contrary to the plain language of sections 1 and 1.5 of the name change statutes, the trial court’s interpretation of section 2.5 creates an entirely new category of individuals not entitled to petition for a name change. This categorical exclusion of non-U.S. citizens, per the trial court’s interpretation, is hidden in subsection (a)(5) of I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5, a statute that sets out information that must be included in the petition.
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As set out in full above, I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a) provides a list of information to be submitted with a name change petition for an individual who is at least seventeen years of age. We interpret this provision as requiring submission of the enumerated information whenever possible. Where a petitioner is unable to provide certain information, however, the petitioner is relieved from the necessity to produce it. For example, a homeless person is not precluded from seeking a name change simply because they cannot provide a current address as required by subsection (a)(2). Similarly, here, Petitioners are unable to provide proof that they are United States citizens. Therefore, they are absolved of providing such proof.
The absence of any of the information required by I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5(a) will certainly be apparent to the trial court upon review of the petition, and we encourage a petitioner to include in the petition an explanation of why he or she cannot provide certain information. For example, in this case, Doe’s petition set out that he “is not a U.S. Citizen but was granted asylum in the United States in 2015 because he is transgender and was granted permanent residency in 2016.” Appendix at 19. A trial court, of course, should address any missing information at the hearing on the petition.
Ultimately, the task of the trial court is to consider all the testimony, documentary evidence, and information before it, including any lack of information. As long as the petitioner, a natural person at least seventeen years old and not subject to the specific exclusions in I.C. § 34-28-2-1.5, establishes that the name change is not being sought for fraudulent purposes, the trial court is required to recognize the name change. [Footnote omitted.] See Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d at 860; see also Leone, 933 N.E.2d at 1254.
In this case, the trial court made abundantly clear its finding that Petitioners were each seeking a name change in good faith and not for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. The trial court indicated that it could easily grant the petitions if it were not for the citizenship requirement that it believed existed in subsection (a)(5) of I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5. Having concluded that the applicable statutes do not require United States citizenship in order to obtain a name change, we remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Petitioners’ respective petitions for a name change.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
Robb, J. and Bradford, C.J., concur.