Vaidik, J.
The State charged John Yeager with four Level 3 felony offenses, alleging that he battered the two-year-old son of his girlfriend. After the trial court set bail at $250,000 cash only, Yeager filed a motion to reduce his bail. Although the pretrial director recommended that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring and Yeager presented evidence that he had no criminal history besides underage drinking, lived in the area his whole life, lived in the same house (which he was buying) for twelve years, had a job to which he could return, and had a good relationship with his family (who also lived in the area and was supportive of him), the court denied his motion. Yeager now appeals.
Because Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing that he recognizes the court’s authority to bring him to trial and there is no evidence that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of the victim or the community, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Yeager’s motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bail. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring.
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Yeager argues that “the bail as set was excessive. The trial court’s decision refusing to lower it and fashion a reasonable method for posting was an abuse of discretion.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The Indiana Constitution prohibits excessive bail. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16. “A decision upon the question of excessiveness must be based upon two basic and related considerations: (1) The object of bail itself, and (2) the financial ability of the accused to provide the required amount of bail.” Samm v. State, 893 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). “The object of bail is not to effect punishment in advance of conviction.” Id. “Rather, it is to ensure the presence of the accused when required without the hardship of incarceration before guilt has been proved and while the presumption of innocence is to be given effect.” Id.
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Here, Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing that he “recognizes the court’s authority to bring [him] to trial,” as required by Section 35-33-8-5(c). Yeager has no criminal history besides underage drinking and has never failed to appear at a court proceeding. In addition, Yeager has lived in the Jefferson County/Jennings County area his entire life and in the same house for twelve years. Yeager had a steady job to which he could return and was paying for his house. Yeager’s family also lives in the same area and is supportive of him. Although Yeager faces four Level 3 felony charges for allegedly battering a two-year-old (and a potentially lengthy sentence if he is convicted), this does not mean that Yeager presents a risk of not appearing. Indeed, the Jefferson County Pretrial Director found no risk.
As for the trial court’s finding that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of J.G. and the community, Yeager claims that the fact that he “has merely been accused, cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to the alleged victim or the community.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7. We agree…Without any evidence to show that Yeager is a danger, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Yeager’s motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bond. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Code § 35-33-8-11(a). The no-contact order shall remain in place. See Ind. Code § 35- 33-8-3.6.
We note this result is consistent with the new evidence-based risk-assessment system that Indiana has adopted. Effective January 1, 2020, Indiana Criminal Rule 26(A) and (B) provides:
(A) If an arrestee does not present a substantial risk of flight or danger to themselves or others, the court should release the arrestee without money bail or surety subject to such restrictions and conditions as determined by the court except when:
(1) The arrestee is charged with murder or treason.
(2) The arrestee is on pre-trial release not related to the incident that is the basis for the present arrest.
(3) The arrestee is on probation, parole or other community supervision.
(B) In determining whether an arrestee presents a substantial risk of flight or danger to self or other persons or to the public, the court should utilize the results of an evidence-based risk assessment approved by the Indiana Office of Court Services, and such other information as the court finds relevant. The court is not required to administer an assessment prior to releasing an arrestee if administering the assessment will delay the arrestee’s release.
(Emphasis added). See also Ind. Code §§ 35-33-8-3.8, 0.5. According to the executive director of the Indiana Office of Court Services, which oversaw the development of the new evidence-based risk-assessment system, “Under Criminal Rule 26, counties will use the IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool to assess risk of failure during the pretrial period.” Mary Kay Hudson, Smart on Crime: Stakeholders Attend Pretrial Summit, Indiana Court Times, Dec. 20, 2019, http://indianacourts.us/times/2019/12/smart-on-crime-stakeholders-attendpretrial-summit/[https://perma.cc/36L8-24JC]. The purpose of this new system is “maximizing public safety, maximizing court appearance, and maximizing pretrial release.” Ind. Office of Court Servs., About, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3900.htm [https://perma.cc/BP54- DQRA].
Notwithstanding Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), this opinion is effective immediately, and the trial court need not await a certification of this opinion by the Clerk of Courts before releasing Yeager to pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Appellate Rule 1 (“The Court may, upon the motion of a party or the Court’s own motion, permit deviation from these Rules.”); see also Town of Ellettsville v. Despirito, 87 N.E.3d 9, 12 (Ind. 2017) (making opinion effective immediately notwithstanding Appellate Rule 65).
Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.