Vaidik, J.
R.W. was convicted of Level 2 felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 3 felony attempted robbery resulting in bodily injury in connection with a shooting during a drug-deal-gone-bad. Based on the evidence presented at trial, including discrepancies in the evidence about R.W.’s car and hair, the lack of physical evidence connecting R.W. to the offenses, and the fact that the victim never identified R.W. as the shooter, we find that the evidence is insufficient to prove that R.W. was the shooter and therefore reverse his convictions.
R.W. contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions…Again, the State’s theory was that R.W. was the shooter. During closing argument, it briefly suggested that R.W. was guilty as an accomplice even if he wasn’t the shooter: “If, for some reason, you don’t believe that Mr. R.W. was the one (1) with the handgun, but he participated in this offense, he’s guilty . . . of the same charges that everyone else is because they knew what they were doing.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 179-80. On appeal, the State abandons the accomplice theory and focuses solely on R.W. being the shooter…Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that R.W. was the shooter. We hold that it is not.
To begin, Speck and Krick consistently described the assailants’ car as burnt orange/red, not black, and their descriptions of the shooter do not match R.W.. The State describes these as “minor discrepancies.” Id. at 22. We disagree. The identity of the shooter was the focus of the investigation. Immediately after the shooting, Deputy Laforet went to IU Health West Hospital to speak with Krick. Deputy Laforet wanted to get a description of the shooter so police could act quickly to apprehend him. Krick described the shooter as a black male with “dreads” wearing a hoodie but did not mention glasses. Around midnight, about two hours after the shooting, Detective Tyree met with Krick at the sheriff’s department. Again, Krick described the shooter as having “dreadlocks” and wearing a hoodie, with no mention of glasses. Around 2:00 a.m., Detective Larsen spoke with Speck at IU Health Methodist Hospital, and Speck described the shooter as a black male in his late teens with “an afro and glasses.” After getting a warrant for Geoffrey Carr’s phone and phone records, the investigation focused on R.W.. Detective Tyree, however, did not show Speck a photo array to see if he could identify the shooter. See Tr. Vol. III p. 95 (Detective Tyree: “I thought that it best not to do a photo array.”). Although Detective Tyree showed Krick a photo array and Krick circled a couple “could-bes,” the photo array was “lost or destroyed,” and the jury was instructed that it could infer that Krick did not identify R.W.. In short, neither victim identified R.W. as the shooter before trial.
R.W. presented evidence, unchallenged by the State, that he had short hair around the time of the shooting (and for at least nine years before then) and that he has never had dreadlocks. During his testimony, Speck described the shooter as a black male wearing a hoodie and black-rimmed glasses. Despite telling Detective Larsen shortly after the shooting that the shooter had an “afro,” Speck gave no description of the shooter’s hair at trial. The State contends that “Speck identified R.W. as the shooter at trial.” Appellee’s Br. p. 20. We disagree. It is true that Speck testified that he “kn[e]w” R.W. was the shooter, but his only basis for saying so was that the shooter was wearing “black-framed glasses” that, according to Speck, looked like the glasses R.W. was wearing during trial. Tr. Vol. II p. 110. In essence, Speck was saying “the shooter was wearing glasses that looked like the glasses of the person sitting at the defense table.” That is a far cry from saying “the person who shot me is the person sitting at the defense table”—and Speck said nothing of the sort. At best, Speck identified the shooter’s style of glasses, not the shooter himself. Moreover, State’s Exhibit 95 shows R.W. wearing glasses, and there is nothing particularly unique about them.
…
Second, the State presented text messages that R.W. received after the shooting. At 10:56 p.m. on February 8, about an hour after the shooting, R.W. received a text message from Edwards stating, “Appreciate you brother.” And the following morning at 7:17 a.m., R.W. received the following text message, “Aye don’t tell nobody what happen last nite!! Not even yo friends.” The State presented no evidence as to who sent this last message to R.W.. These vague text messages do not establish that R.W. knew about the shooting, let alone that he was the shooter.
Third, the State presented evidence that the black Dodge Challenger rented by R.W.’s mother had a hole in the windshield when it was returned to Enterprise on February 10 and that bullets were found in the rental car five months after the shooting. Setting aside the color differences in the Challenger (burnt orange/red vs. black) and even assuming that the hole in the windshield was from a bullet, the State presented no evidence that the hole in the Challenger’s windshield was connected to the events in this case.
…
Fourth, the State presented evidence from Detective Tyree that at 9:54 p.m. on February 8, R.W. was about fifty meters (164 feet) from the location of the shooting. But even if R.W. was near the scene of the shooting, this evidence does not establish that he was the shooter. While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial is sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
…
Given the discrepancies in the evidence about R.W.’s car and hair, the lack of physical evidence connecting R.W. to the offenses, the fact that Speck never identified R.W. as the shooter, the vague text messages, and the fact that the location information does not establish that R.W. was the shooter, we find that the proof at trial is not sufficient to support the verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse R.W.’s convictions.
Reversed.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.