David, J.
Last year, our Court handed down Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201 (Ind. 2019), a case in which we determined that the doctrine of claim preclusion applies to child in need of services (CHINS) proceedings. Without the benefit of that opinion, the parties in this case argued over whether the Department of Child Services (DCS) could file a subsequent CHINS petition alleging R.L. was a child in need of services after an initial petition was dismissed with prejudice. Although the second case proceeded and R.L. was found to be a CHINS, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding DCS was barred from relitigating this matter. After Matter of Eq.W. was handed down, however, the State successfully petitioned for rehearing and the Court of Appeals reversed course, ultimately affirming the juvenile court’s CHINS finding.
Mother sought transfer, arguing that DCS should have been barred from filing a successive CHINS action after the first petition was dismissed with prejudice. Applying Matter of Eq.W. to the circumstances of this case, we agree with Mother and find that the subsequent CHINS petition should have been barred. We therefore reverse the juvenile court and dismiss the present CHINS petition with prejudice.
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Both sides attempt to use our recent decision in Matter of Eq.W. as sword and shield. Matter of Eq.W. stands for the proposition that when DCS attempts to bite the proverbial apple, it must do so with intentionality and cannot engage in piecemeal litigation to get subsequent bites at the same apple. In other words, DCS must have its house in order when it institutes a CHINS proceeding or else it risks dismissal that will bar future actions. In our view, DCS has attempted to take the prohibited second bite in this case after it largely failed to make its case during the first CHINS filing. For this reason—and those expressed below—we agree with Mother that the second CHINS petition pertaining to R.L. should have been barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
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So in sum, the basic framework of Eq.W. straddled the divide between finality in a court’s determination and the flexibility demanded by the evolving nature of CHINS cases. As was the case in Matter of Eq.W. and many of the aforementioned cases from other states, the battleground often concerns the third element of claim preclusion: whether the matter now in issue was or might have been determined in the former suit. While DCS must introduce new allegations of material fact in a subsequent petition, Eq.W. also cautioned courts against turning a blind eye to piecemeal litigation and/or actions that undermine the confidence we must place in our State’s child welfare system. Here, we take issue with both.
Recall that Matter of Eq.W. observed, “DCS must necessarily rely on the past actions of parents to give a trial court the full story of why a CHINS petition was filed in the first place.” 124 N.E.3d at 1212. There, we agreed with DCS’s argument that “past acts by parents can be relevant to new CHINS filings involving the same parents and children.” Id. at 1211. However, our opinion also warned that repeated filings are “ripe for potential abuse” and we declined to “endorse the procedural tactics employed in [Eq.W.] to essentially string out the CHINS proceeding until enough evidence was collected, all the while keeping the children separated from their parents.” Id.; see also In re Interest of Noah B., 891 N.W.2d at 124. In our view, the record in this case demonstrates the type of piecemeal litigation that Eq.W. sought to prevent.
First, the second petition largely duplicated allegations or relied on matters that could have been determined in the first petition. These included allegations that Mother was currently involved in a separate CHINS action with her other child, that services had not been completed in that case, that Mother failed to follow through with treatment after a psychological evaluation, and that Mother and Father had a tempestuous relationship. To be sure, these are serious allegations, but DCS failed to carry its burden in the first petition, which ultimately led to dismissal with prejudice.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the second petition are concerning. Although the first petition had been dismissed, Mother either did not know about the dismissal or had no knowledge that R.L. should have been returned to her care. The FCM was involved in both the first and second petitions; she was aware of the first petition’s dismissal but made no effort to return the child. Without speculating whether Mother’s actions would have been different had she known that her child could have been returned before refusing the FCM’s request to inspect her apartment, we are concerned that Mother’s refusal became part and parcel of the second filing.
Finally, our underlying rationale in Matter of Eq.W. is amplified in this case, especially when it comes to procedural protections for children and parents. “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (citation omitted). Parents should appropriately be held accountable for the care of their children, but DCS also bears responsibility to move “cautiously and meticulously … through each stage of a CHINS proceeding.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1210. The tactics employed by DCS in this case undermine the confidence parents have in Indiana’s child welfare system. This practice should not be condoned, especially when DCS has vastly superior resources at its disposal to properly and accurately move through each stage of the CHINS proceeding.
For these reasons, we find that the juvenile court should have granted Mother’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the juvenile court and dismiss the present CHINS action with prejudice. See id. at 1212 (observing that, “Practically speaking, if the parent or guardian is successful in showing claim preclusion applied to bar a subsequent petition, the CHINS petition must be dismissed”)
Conclusion
Matter of Eq.W. sought to prevent the type of piecemeal litigation that occurred in this case. The subsequent petition was largely duplicative of the first and enunciated three new, weakly supported allegations. At least one of those allegations was likely the result of DCS’s failure to inform Mother that her child could have been returned to her care—information that could have further informed Mother’s actions. If there is to be any predictability for parents, children, and the State in these proceedings, we must hold each party properly accountable to their individual responsibilities. Therefore, Mother’s motion to dismiss should have been granted because under the framework of Eq.W., the subsequent petition should have been barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. We reverse the trial court and dismiss the present CHINS petition with prejudice.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.