Robb, J.
Tiffany Holsapple pleaded guilty in two cases and was sentenced to sixteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). The sentence was stayed pending her participation in a problem-solving court program. After she was terminated from the program for violating the terms and conditions of the participation agreement, the trial court lifted the stay and ordered Holsapple to serve the sixteen-year-sentence. Holsapple appeals, raising one issue for our review that we restate as whether the trial court was required by the plea agreement to lift the stay and impose her previously agreed sentence. Concluding the trial court had discretion to determine an appropriate sanction, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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[Holsapple] was prosecuted, so she was not participating as a result of a pretrial diversion program. And the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on her plea of guilty and successful completion of the problem solving court program meant only that her sentence would be permanently stayed not that her charges would be dismissed, so she was not participating as a result of a section 14 deferral. Therefore, although it was never explicitly stated, she must have been referred to problem solving court as a condition of probation. Essentially, Holsapple’s entire sentence was suspended to probation and the condition of her probation was that she successfully complete a problem solving court program. Then there was an additional set of conditions that controlled her participation in the problem solving court program.
When Holsapple was terminated from the problem solving court program, she violated the condition of her probation. The trial court determined she was no longer eligible to participate in a problem solving court, essentially determining her probation should be revoked, and lifted the stay of her sentence, ordering her to serve the entire term as a sanction. Thus, we review this action as any probation revocation.
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Holsapple contends that, because sanction decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the trial court in this case erred in determining that it had no discretion to impose any sanction other than full revocation of her stayed sentence.
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Holsapple argues “[t]he language of the plea agreement should not be allowed to strip a court of the discretion as to how to respond to violations.”
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Although it appears Holsapple entered but a single agreement rather than a plea agreement followed by a separate agreement resolving probation revocation proceedings such that the Woods distinction would not apply to her, in essence, the agreement here is two agreements in one: a plea agreement providing for the disposition of the criminal charges through a sentence suspended to probation and a probation revocation agreement providing for strict liability if probation is violated. See Sullivan, 56 N.E.3d at 1158-59 (addressing a similar two-in-one agreement). And pursuant to the authority of Woods, Sullivan, and Hampton, an agreement cannot override the trial court’s discretion in that way in a probation revocation or similar proceeding.
Holsapple was convicted and sentenced pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, but execution of her sentences was stayed while she participated in a problem solving court program. When she was alleged to have violated the terms of the program, the trial court held a hearing on the notice of termination request from the problem solving court, and Holsapple admitted to violating the terms of her participation agreement by failing to appear for Mental Health Court, failing to appear for a required drug test, and failing to appear for a Mental Health Court sanctions hearing. As for the sanction, she noted she had successfully participated in the problem solving courts without a single sanction for a year and a half but she began to feel overwhelmed and discouraged when her case manager was switched, and she asked to be returned to Drug Court. The trial court found that based on the admitted violations, Holsapple was no longer eligible to participate in problem solving court and Holsapple does not specifically argue that the trial court abused its discretion in that determination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s determination that Holsapple violated the terms of her placement. However, contrary to the trial court’s belief that it was required to impose the agreed-upon sanction of full execution of the stayed sentence, a plea agreement cannot bind the trial court’s hands as to an appropriate sanction. Rather, as in any probation revocation proceeding, the trial court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order that Holsapple serve the entire sixteen-year-sentence because it is based on the predetermined sanction and remand for the trial court to determine in its discretion the appropriate sanction for her violations.
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Holsapple had violated the terms of her problem solving court placement. However, the trial court was not obligated to impose the sanction stated in a strict liability agreement between the State and Holsapple upon finding a violation. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to determine the appropriate sanction, including but not necessarily limited to ordering full execution of her stayed sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.