Kirsch, J.
Kathleen Burdick (“Burdick”) and Julie Romano (“Romano”) were riding their horses in a horse arena when Burdick fell and suffered serious injuries. Burdick and her husband Bruce Burdick sued Romano, and the jury returned a verdict for Romano. Burdick raises four issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to read jury instructions on negligence;
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by reading a jury instruction on inherent risks of equine activities; and
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by reading a jury instruction on incurred risk.
We affirm.
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Burdick argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to read her instructions on negligence, duty, and reasonable care because, she claims, this is a simple negligence case. She likens her law suit to a “dog bite” case, where “the owner of a dog, with known dangerous propensities, has a duty of reasonable care to warn others, and to keep the dog on a leash and/or to tie the dog up and/or to lock the dog up.” Appellants’ Amended Br. at 12. See, e.g., Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind. 1993) (“[T]he owner of a dog is bound to know the natural propensities of dogs, and if these propensities are the kind which reasonably might be expected to cause injury, the owner must use reasonable care to prevent such injuries from occurring.”). Because the evidence shows that Romano knew that Sheza had exhibited dangerous propensities, i.e., Sheza’s history of kicking other horses, and that Romano failed to exercise reasonable care by failing to tie up Sheza once she dismounted Sheza, Burdick claims the evidence supported instructing the jury on negligence.
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Burdick contends that she and Romano were not engaged in a sporting event. Burdick raises this argument as a separate, stand-alone issue, claiming that the trial court abused its instruction by reading the “sporting event pattern jury instruction.” Appellants’ Amended Br. at 39-44. However, the crux of Burdick’s argument about the sporting event instruction is that Burdick and Romano were not engaged in a sporting event under the terms of the equine activity statutes, see Indiana Code chapter 34-31-5, et. seq., and specifically under the statute that defines “equine activity,” Indiana Code section 34-6-2-41. Therefore, we will address Burdick’s argument within the context of those statutes.
Indiana Code section 34-6-2-41 defines “equine activity”… Burdick argues that because this statute does not use the words “sports” or “sports participants,” Burdick and Romano could not have been engaged in a sporting activity, so the trial court should have instructed the jury on negligence. Appellants’ Amended Br. at 43.
We agree with Romano that the statutory definition of equine activity does not preclude sporting activities. The activities listed by the statute as equine activities is not exhaustive, evinced by the words, “‘Equine activity,’ for purposes of IC 34-31-5, includes the following.”…
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Burdick and Romano were engaged in a sporting activity. Burdick and Romano were not riding their horses in a pasture or other country terrain but within an arena specifically and exclusively designed for horse training. Tr. Vol. 4 at 66. Both Burdick and Romano described their activities in the arena as tricks and training related to the sport of horse-back riding, where, for instance, Burdick testified that she was going through her training routine in the arena. Id. at 61. As part of the routine, Burdick was “loping” Chip as part of a cool-down after she completed her training routine with Chip. Id. When Burdick completed her training routine, she accepted Romano’s invitation to join her and Sheza to ride in a zig zag pattern through the poles erected in the arena. Id. at 61-62. Burdick and Romano also engaged in other behavior to demonstrate tricks and training techniques associated with the sport. Id. at 56-57, 61-63. For instance, Burdick characterized putting her hoodie over Chip’s eyes as a trick that was a training technique. Id. at 56. She also testified that without proper training, a horse would “spook” if its head was covered by an object. Id. Burdick stated that demonstrating to another person how the horse would respond to training is part of the sport. Id. at 57. Burdick also acknowledged that when Romano was going to demonstrate that Sheza could push a barrel with her nose, it was to show a technique that Romano had used to train Sheza. Id. Also, in explaining the “ground tie” that Romano used after she dismounted Sheza (in Burdick’s version of the events), Burdick and Romano testified that a ground tie is a trick or training technique where the rider dismounts the horse, drops the reins to the ground, and the horse stands as if the horse was tied to the ground. Tr. Vol. 2 at 163; Tr. Vol. 3 at 244; Tr. Vol. 4 at 58. Training a horse to stand still during a ground tie is important because if an emergency arises, it may be important for a horse to stay put. Tr. Vol. 2 at 163. Romano testified that ground training is “definitely part of the equine world.” Id. at 164. Finally, both Burdick and Romano agreed that Romano was in the process of retrieving a barrel to demonstrate a trick and training technique associated with the sport. Id. at 142-43, Tr. Vol. 3 at 244-45; Tr. Vol. 4 at 58. Thus, contrary to Burdick’s argument, this is not a simple “dog bite” case but instead is a sporting activity case. See Appellants’ Amended Br. at 12. Our courts have ruled that noncompetitive golf, practicing karate kicks, and riding a mountain bike on a trial are sporting activities. Accordingly, we cannot state that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Burdick’s injuries occurred during a sporting event. See Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1082 (Ind. 2017); Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 406; Hoosier Mountain Bike Ass’n, Inc. v. Kaler, 73 N.E.3d 712, 714-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); and Gyruiak, 775 N.E.2d at 395.
Because Burdick and Romano were engaged in a sporting activity, Burdick was required to show that Romano was reckless, not merely negligent…
Because the undisputed evidence shows that Burdick and Romano were engaged in a sporting activity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on negligence for two reasons: First, the evidence did not support an instruction for negligence. See Kimbrough, 55 N.E.3d at 339. Second, an instruction on negligence could have confused and misled the jury about Burdick’s burden of proof. See Miller, 706 N.E.2d at 248. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to refuse Burdick’s tendered instructions on negligence.
Burdick also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on the inherent risks of equine activity…
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Waiver aside, the instruction is an accurate statement of the law as it comes from the statute that defines inherent risks from equine activities.
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Burdick also contends the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on incurred risk because the evidence did not support the instruction…
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Contrary to Burdick’s claim, the evidence supported the incurred risk instruction. Burdick is mistaken that the incurred risk at issue was Romano’s decision to dismount Sheza and leave Sheza untied and unattended. Instead, the risk at issue was Sheza’s tendency to kick other horses. Sometime before the incident, Burdick had asked Romano several times to show Burdick the trick where Sheza would push the barrel with her nose. Tr. Vol. 2 at 140-41. Burdick was aware of Sheza’s history of kicking other horses because Romano told Burdick several times that Sheza was a kicker. Tr. Vol. 3 at 239; Tr. Vol. 4 at 61. Burdick also testified that before the incident she had observed Sheza act aggressively toward other horses and attempt to kick other horses. Tr. Vol. 3 at 239. She also admitted that being kicked by a horse was a risk of the sport and conceded that as a horse expert she knew all the risks associated with horse-related sporting activities. Tr. Vol. 4 at 59, 61. Therefore, because the evidence supported the incurred risk instruction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reading the instruction to the jury. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.