Najam, J.
Statement of the Case Gregory Jacob appeals the trial court’s grant of Dylan Vigh’s motion to dismiss Jacob’s complaint against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Jacob presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it granted Vigh’s motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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In May 2019, Jacob filed a verified complaint against Vigh alleging fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and “violation of the rules of professional conduct[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 3. In his complaint, Jacob described in detail the factual basis for his claims. After two extensions of time to answer or otherwise plead, in September, Vigh moved to dismiss Jacob’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
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In his motion to dismiss, Vigh characterized Jacob’s complaint as if it were based entirely upon purported violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and he alleged that such issues are the exclusive province of the Indiana Supreme Court and, thus, that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Jacob’s claims. This court addressed that same argument, and rejected it, in Alvarado v. Nagy, 819 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In Alvarado, we acknowledged that our Supreme Court is the “exclusive arbiter of matters involving attorney discipline in this state.” Id. at 523. However, we concluded that Alvarado’s complaint fell “well outside” the boundaries of “attorney discipline cases” over which the Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction, Id. at 524, and held that Alvarado had stated a claim for legal malpractice. Id. at 525….
Likewise, here, in essence, Jacob’s complaint alleges that Vigh committed legal malpractice when Vigh kept the $10,000 retainer without performing any work. See id. In particular, Jacob alleged facts that, if proven, would establish: 1) that he employed Vigh as his attorney, which created a duty, 2) that Vigh failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, which constituted breach of that duty, and 3) that such negligence was the proximate cause 4) of damage to Jacob. See Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84 (Ind. 1996). Jacob’s complaint includes each of those elements, and he specifically avers that Vigh committed fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, which “legal theories of recovery . . . support a legal malpractice action.” See Whitehouse v. Quinn, 477 N.E.2d 270, 273-74 (Ind. 1985).
As we have noted, Vigh contends that the trial court “has no jurisdiction to adjudicate” any claims related to his alleged misconduct. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 8. Vigh is mistaken. If Jacob’s claims are proven, Vigh may be subject to sanctions under the Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and Discipline of Attorneys. That is not for us to decide. But we can say that our Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over such matters does not preempt or preclude a tort or contract claim arising from the same facts.
In sum, while Jacob’s complaint includes allegations that Vigh violated certain canons of the Rules of Professional Conduct, that does not mean the trial court lacks jurisdiction over his complaint, which alleges claims of fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty and supports a claim for legal malpractice. See Alvarado, 819 N.E.2d at 525. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Jacob’s complaint.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.