Sharpnack, S.J.
Statement of the Case
Raquel Walters, a natural child of David Walters, appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment that Brittany M. Corder, Matthew T. O’Brien, and Molly L. O’Brien (“O’Brien Children”), who are also natural children of David Walters but who were adopted out of the Walters family, are beneficiaries under two trusts established by Mildred Goodman, their great grandmother. On this issue of first impression, we hold that under these facts where the children were adopted out of the family after the settlor’s death, the adopted out children retained their status as beneficiaries of Mildred. We therefore affirm the trial court.
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The issue in this case arose due to David’s death in 2017. Mildred’s will created a trust for her grandsons, David and his brother, and provided:
Upon the death of either of my grandsons, the Trustee shall distribute the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such grandchild’s trust share to his then living children, share and share alike, or if such deceased grandchild shall leave no surviving child or children, then the share to which such deceased grandchild would have been entitled shall be added to the share of my other grandchild, or if my other grandchild is not then living, the then surviving children of such deceased grandchild shall take the share their parent would have been entitled, share and share alike.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 22, ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
In 1968, Mildred executed the Irrevocable Trust. The provision at issue within that trust provides:
Upon the death of [Ann], in the event that she survives her husband and qualifies as set out above, or upon the death of Charles Henry Walters in the event he survives her, all of the trust estate shall forthwith be distributed to the issue of Charles Henry Walters per stirpes and not per capita, provided that each and all of said issue shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years.
Id. at 37, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). At the time of the hearing on the parties’ motions for summary judgment, Ann was still living. However, the trustee included the Irrevocable Trust in its request for instructions from the court as to the interpretation of Mildred’s trust agreements because, upon Ann’s passing, the trustee will again face the question concerning the inclusion of the O’Brien Children as beneficiaries.
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We begin with the language that created the trust. Upon David’s death, his share of the trust is to be divided among his living children. The term “children” is not defined in the terms of the trust, and the term is not qualified or restricted in any way (other than requiring the children to be “living”). Further, the trust language is silent as to adopted children—whether adopted in or out of the family. At the time Mildred included in her will the Testamentary Trust in 1991, the Indiana Trust Code did not define the term “children.” [Footnote omitted.] Further, caselaw indicates that the ordinary, popular, and legal sense of the word “children” embraces the first generation of offspring. Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123, 127 (1925). All four of David’s offspring were living at the time of his death.
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As we did with her Testamentary Trust, we examine Mildred’s intent with regard to the Irrevocable Trust. The term “issue” is not defined by the terms of the trust, and, other than requiring the issue to be twenty-one, the language of this provision does not restrict or limit the term or create a separate class for adopted children. The document is silent with regard to issue that may be adopted in or out of the family. The term “issue” is not defined in the trust code, but it has been defined in caselaw as meaning “descendants.” Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9 N.E. 919, 922 (1887); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “issue” as lineal descendants; offspring). Here, David was a descendant of Charles, and Brittany, Matthew, Molly, and Raquel are all descendants or offspring of David.
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The courts of our state have made it abundantly clear that the settlor’s intent is the sovereign guide in the interpretation of the terms of a trust. See, e.g., Doll v. Post, 132 N.E.3d 34, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (primary purpose in construing trust is to ascertain and give effect to settlor’s intention), trans. denied (2020). We have before us no evidence of an intent on the part of Mildred to exclude her three eldest grandchildren from membership in the classes of beneficiaries of these two trusts merely because her grandson gave his consent to their adoption by their stepfather after Mildred’s death. Therefore, we determine that, despite the fact that the O’Brien Children were adopted out of the Walters family, they retain their status as beneficiaries in the two trusts as the “children” of David and the “issue” of David’s father
Conclusion
Accordingly, absent any evidence in the trusts or in the surrounding circumstances of an intent to exclude the O’Brien Children because of an unanticipated adoption, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the O’Brien Children.
Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.