Brown, J.
Jennifer Cook appeals her conviction for attempted obstruction of justice as a level 6 felony. We affirm
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Cook argues the State failed to prove threat or coercion regarding a specific official proceeding or investigation because the content of the communication between Collins and Cook is unclear. She asserts the essence of the communication between them was that they should solve any differences they had as neighbors and without the need for the intervention of others.
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The record reveals that Collins became aware of a dispute between Cook and the Brumleys regarding noise coming from Cook’s house which resulted in a court proceeding. At some point, Collins was subpoenaed to provide a deposition for the trial. Collins testified that Cook told him he “needed to consider what was going on and take this opportunity to bow out of the proceedings so that . . . [he] wouldn’t be further involved and . . . that [he] wouldn’t lose anything in the end.” Transcript Volume II at 26. She also said that she was a successful woman and “she had uh, the proof of that, by her home, and her cars and all of that, that she was a winner” and he “could stand to lose everything, and that [he] would wind up with nothing.” Id. We respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion’s characterization of the statements by Cook to Collins, who was a witness subpoenaed to provide a deposition, that he needed to take the opportunity to bow out of the proceedings so that he would not lose anything in the end, that he could stand to lose everything, and that he would wind up with nothing, as merely a standard conversation between neighbors. When asked if he believed she was threatening him with something, he answered affirmatively. To the extent Cook asserts that Collins admitted he was initially wearing ear protection and did not understand much of what was said, Collins testified that he removed his earplugs “[a]s soon as she started to talk.” Id. at 42.
Based upon the record, we conclude the State presented evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook committed attempted obstruction of justice as a level 6 felony. See McElfresh, 51 N.E.3d at 109-111 (holding that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the letter sent by defendant was coercive within the meaning of the obstruction of justice statute and that defendant was guilty of attempted obstruction of justice).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Cook’s conviction.
Affirmed. Riley, J., concurs.
Baker, J. dissents with opinion.
Baker, J. dissenting
I respectfully dissent.
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Though I do not question the constitutionality of the obstruction of justice statute, I note that we must evaluate these types of statutes with greater scrutiny, as they can chill ordinary speech between private individuals. And in my opinion, this colloquy between Cook and Collins amounts to a standard conversation between neighbors, plain and simple. Cook approached Collins while he was mowing his lawn, Collins was wearing earbuds and listening to music, and beyond Collins testifying that he “started parking the car differently and . . . didn’t stay home a lot,” tr. vol. ii p. 29, he did not testify that he thought Cook would actually come through on anything she said.
It is true that Collins had previously given a deposition for a court proceeding involving Cook. But to convict Cook of attempted obstruction of justice for the aforementioned language is concerning and, quite frankly, a bit of a stretch. Nothing in this criminal statute precludes Cook from discussing the case with her friends, family, or even random strangers. And going forward, it is worth wondering what other “threatening” or “coercive” language might be proscribed under this statute and under the analysis employed by the majority.
In other words, should a conviction like this be upheld, I am worried that other individuals might be caught in the crosshairs of criminal prosecution for attempted obstruction of justice should they engage in similar conversations. If anything, we would encourage friends and neighbors to resolve disputes amongst themselves without any court involvement; allowing Cook’s conviction to stand could discourage these very resolutions from taking place. In my view, the evidence here is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted obstruction of justice, and no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of this crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse Cook’s conviction. I respectfully dissent.