Darden, S.J.
Guadalupe Pava appeals her conviction by jury of battery by a person at least eighteen years of age resulting in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years of age, a Level 5 felony. We affirm.
Pava raises two issues, which we restate as: I. Whether the battery statute, Indiana Code section 35-42-2- 1, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pava’s case. II. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Pava’s conviction.
…
I. Constitutional Claim – Vagueness
Pava argues that the battery statute, as applied to her case, is unconstitutionally vague and violates both her right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment and her right to due course of law under article one, section twelve of the Indiana Constitution. She concedes that she “did not challenge the constitutionality of applying the battery statute to her case below . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. The State argues that Pava has waived her constitutional claim.
…
We recognize that Pava did not file a motion to dismiss raising her constitutional claim in the trial court, but nevertheless we choose to address the merits of her claim. See Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (addressing merits of vagueness claim despite being raised for first time on appeal), trans. denied.
…
Pava argues that under the facts of her case, and in conjunction with the parental privilege to discipline one’s child, “the decision of what is or isn’t reasonable corporal punishment” under Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 is too subjective, and she had no constitutionally acceptable guidance as to whether striking P.P. crossed the line into illegal battery. Appellant’s Br. p. 12. After reviewing the totality of the facts, circumstances, and evidence, we disagree for two reasons.
First, Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 sets forth a scienter, or state of mind, requirement: the State must prove a defendant acted knowingly or intentionally. An intent to touch another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, or knowledge that one is touching another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, is a different state of mind than an intent to implement corrective discipline. The scienter requirement ensures that a person has fair notice as to what kind of conduct is punishable as battery. See Shuger v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1226, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting vagueness challenge to statute that outlawed interference with hunting; the statute’s scienter requirement clarified what type of conduct would violate the statute), trans. denied.
Second, the Indiana Supreme Court has implemented a reasonableness standard to assess the parental discipline privilege. In Willis, the Court adopted the Restatement of the Law (Second) on Torts, which provides, in relevant part, that a “‘parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.’” Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 147(1) (1965)). The reasonable person standard, as adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Willis, is objective rather than subjective. As the Court noted in a different case, “a reasonable person standard provides enough notice of prohibited conduct and limitations upon discretionary enforcement to satisfy constitutional concerns.” Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 576 (Ind. 2014)..
Following the holding in Morgan, we conclude the objective reasonableness standard adopted in Willis would provide sufficient notice of what conduct crosses the line from mere discipline of a child to battery. Pava has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the battery statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her specific act of repeatedly striking P.P. with an electrical cord. See Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied (statute outlawing criminal gang activity was not unconstitutionally vague; statute included scienter requirements establishing a required state of mind for a defendant to be held criminally liable); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stalking statute not unconstitutionally vague; statute included both a scienter requirement and a reasonableness requirement).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.