Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
This case involves an apartment tenant’s request for an emotional-support animal. The tenant lived at an apartment with a no-pet policy. The tenant asked the landlord if she could have an emotional-support animal and provided a letter from a licensed family and marriage therapist, which said that the tenant had a disability and needed an emotional-support animal to help alleviate her symptoms. The letter, however, identified no disability or symptoms. The landlord requested more information from the tenant, and when the tenant did not provide the requested information and instead brought the animal into her apartment, the landlord evicted her. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission filed a complaint against the landlord, arguing that it failed to accommodate the tenant’s request for an emotional-support animal in violation of the Indiana Fair Housing Act. The landlord sought summary judgment, arguing that it did not have enough information to evaluate the tenant’s request for an accommodation because the therapist’s letter failed to identify the tenant’s disability. The trial court denied summary judgment, and the landlord now appeals.
Before a landlord makes a decision about a tenant’s request for an accommodation, it can conduct a “meaningful review” to determine whether the accommodation is required; this review includes requesting documentation and opening a dialogue. Here, when the landlord asked the tenant for more information, the tenant did not respond. By not giving the landlord information about her disability and disability-related need for the animal, the tenant caused a breakdown in the process. Without this basic information, the landlord could not meaningfully review the tenant’s request for an emotional-support animal. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand with instructions for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the landlord.
….
Under federal law, to prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability within the meaning of the FHA6 ; (2) the plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for the disability; (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) the defendant refused to make the accommodation. Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1225- 26 (11th Cir. 2016); Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285. Under the FHA, disability means “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201. “Physical or mental impairment” includes any “mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2). “Major life activities” means “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” Id. at (b).
We begin by pointing out that Landlord doesn’t dispute the first three elements of Tenant’s failure-to-accommodate claim. See Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 61. That is, Landlord doesn’t dispute that Tenant is disabled or that the Tenant requested a reasonable and necessary accommodation. Indeed, Landlord notes it “routinely approve[s]” requests for emotional-support animals. Appellants’ Br. p. 22. Instead, Landlord argues that it was not given enough information to meaningfully review Tenant’s request for an accommodation and therefore cannot be found to have refused her request, which is the fourth element.
….
Here, the designated evidence shows that Snelson’s letter—the only documentation that Tenant gave Landlord to support her request for an emotional-support animal—provides that Tenant “meets the definition of disability”; however, it identifies no disability. Snelson’s letter also provides that Tenant “has certain limitations regarding coping with symptoms that stem from her disability.” Again, the letter identifies no limitations or symptoms of the “disability.” Landlord, at the very least, was entitled to know Tenant’s disability and disability-related need for the animal. See, e.g., Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1287; HUD Notice, Assessing a Person’s Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act at 9. Accordingly, Landlord was justified in trying to open a dialogue with Tenant and requesting more information from her.
Tenant, however, claims that she didn’t respond because Landlord’s requests “went far beyond what it was permitted to ask.”…
….
This case easily differs from Bhogaita. In Bhogaita, the condominium association knew the homeowner’s disability and disability-related need for the animal but nevertheless requested more information from the homeowner. Here, however, Landlord did not know Tenant’s disability or disability-related need for the animal when it requested additional information. This difference between the cases is critical.
Nevertheless, Tenant points out that some of the information the condominium association requested in Bhogaita is similar to what Landlord requested in this case. Specifically, Landlord asked Tenant for three pieces of information:
[P]lease specify the number of sessions you had with Monique Snelson and an approximation of how long each session lasted. We will also need to know your disability. Without providing any specific details regarding your disability, please advise us of the disability so that we can make an informed decision.
Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 43. Even assuming that Landlord’s questions about the number of sessions Tenant had with Snelson and an approximation of how long each session lasted were overbroad, the question about Tenant’s disability was not. Tenant could have told Landlord her disability and chosen not to answer the other two questions. Tenant, however, did nothing. The overbreadth of some of the questions did not absolve Tenant from providing the required information. The same can be said about Landlord’s proposed letter to Snelson. Again, even assuming that Tenant rightfully did not give consent because she believed many, if not all, of the questions to Snelson were overbroad, this still did not absolve Tenant from providing the required information. Neither party should be able to cause a breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. “A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or response, may be acting in bad faith.” Id. Here, Tenant did not respond at all to Landlord, causing a breakdown in the process. Without information about Tenant’s disability and disability-related need for the animal, Landlord could not meaningfully review Tenant’s request for an emotional-support animal. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand with instructions for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of Landlord.
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.