Riley, J.
Appellant-Defendant, Payton Bell (Bell), appeals his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license having a previous felony conviction within fifteen years, a Level 5 felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-47-2-1(a), (e)(2). We affirm.
Bell presents this court with three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following two: (1) Whether his seizure and frisk of his person complied with the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Whether his seizure and frisk of his person was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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Fourth Amendment
Bell’s counsel argued at trial that the deputies had the right to remove Bell from the Lot for having a gun in contravention of IMS policy, an argument which pre-supposes they had the right to approach him and ask him whether he had a gun. In an apparent concession that the initial encounter between him and the deputies was reasonable, Bell does not address the initial encounter but argues that he was subject to an investigatory stop when deputies told him to “stand still, stop” which occurred after the deputies had asked Bell to approach them and after he had begun answering their questions. (Tr. p. 34). Bell also contends that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to support such a stop. The State counters that Bell was not seized until Deputy Hall grabbed Bell’s hand and that the deputies had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that time.
We conclude that the initial encounter was consensual. Only two deputies initially approached Bell, not several. Although they were in uniform, the deputies did not swoop in on Bell in their cruiser with its lights activated. There is no evidence in the record that the Kubota UTV they drove was even demarcated as a police vehicle. The deputies did not draw or display their weapons; they did not touch Bell; they did not yell at Bell, but, rather, spoke to him in a calm and polite manner. In light of the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that Bell was not seized and subjected to an investigatory stop when the deputies initially approached him. See id.
We also conclude that, after this initial consensual encounter, reasonable suspicion developed to support an investigatory stop and a frisk for weapons. Contrary to Bell’s assertion, he was not seized and subjected to an investigatory stop when the deputies told him to “stand still, stop” after he had taken a few steps backwards away from them. (Tr. p. 34). A “seizure” does not occur until, through physical force or a show of authority, an officer has actually restrained the liberty of an individual. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.6, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L.E.2d 889 (1968). The Supreme Court has also held that no seizure occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes where a subject continued to flee after being commanded by officers to “Stop, in the name of the law!” See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550, 113 L.E.2d 690 (1991).
Here, Bell stepped away from the deputies, and they told him to stand still and stop. The deputies did not touch Bell, draw their firearms, or use an aggressive tone of voice with Bell as they attempted to de-escalate the situation. After being told to stand still and stop, Bell failed to comply with that directive and continued to evade the deputies by moving in the opposite direction of whatever direction they moved. Thus, Bell’s liberty was not constrained until Deputy Hall grabbed Bell’s arm.
However, even if the deputies’ directive to stand still and stop had amounted to a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion.
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Here, after learning that the deputies had received a report that he was carrying a firearm but that he would be allowed to leave the Lot if he were legally carrying it, Bell became nervous and aggressive. Bell also began moving away from the deputies. As the other two deputies were interacting with Bell, Deputy Hall positioned himself behind Bell. Bell eventually turned his body away from the other two deputies and assumed a fighting stance, giving Deputy Hall a plain view of the gun in Bell’s pocket. Deputy Hall testified that he then saw Bell’s hand “coming down,” which we infer from the circumstances was a movement toward the gun.
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Bell argues that the tip received from the two people who had ridden to the Lot with him was not sufficiently reliable to support an investigatory stop. However, for purposes of our analysis we have assumed, without deciding, that the tip was insufficient to supply reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. We have also concluded that the deputies’ initial encounter with Bell was consensual, a type of contact between law enforcement and citizen that requires no level of suspicion to justify. See, e.g., State v. Augustine, 851 N.E.2d 1022, 1025-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (observing that the officer’s approach to the defendant was a consensual encounter which did not implicate the Fourth Amendment). Following that initial encounter, we have concluded that Bell’s own conduct, not the tip, provided reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop and frisk.
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Article 1, Section 11
Bell contends that his state constitutional rights were violated by the deputies when they seized him. Bell also briefly argues that his state rights were infringed by his arrest, but our review of the record of the trial proceedings revealed that Bell addressed his arguments only to the initial encounter and seizure, with nothing argued regarding his arrest. Therefore, we only address whether the deputies’ conduct up to the moment when he was seized by Deputy Hall was within constitutional parameters.
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Although the degree of suspicion and the degree of intrusion are both high in this case, we conclude that the extent of the needs of law enforcement tips the balance in favor of reasonableness. As Bell acknowledges on appeal, the “protection of the public is a legitimate and important law enforcement function.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1002 (Ind. 2014). And, as the State brings to our attention, this court has recognized that “[p]rotecting the public from gun violence is a legitimate and paramount concern of law enforcement, and the State is legitimately concerned with deterring gun violence by unlicensed individuals.” Grayson v. State, 52 N.E.3d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. While initially their need was low when the deputies encountered Bell, the need of the deputies to protect the large crowd present on the Lot, as well as themselves, from potentially being shot by Bell became great when Bell assumed a fighting stance against the deputies and made a movement for his plainly-visible gun. Accordingly, we conclude that the deputies did not infringe upon Bell’s state constitutional rights when they seized him and frisked him for weapons.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that neither Bell’s Fourth Amendment nor his Article 1, Section 11 rights were infringed upon when his own conduct led to the deputies’ reasonable actions.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J. concur