May, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, David A. Tyrie appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him. He presents two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive – whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to refile charges against Tyrie. We affirm and remand.
Tyrie relies on our Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. 1997), affirmed on reh’g 696 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. 1998). In Davenport, the State charged Davenport with murder on July 14, 1994, in Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division 5. Id. at 1228-9. On February 2, 1995, four days before Davenport’s jury trial was to commence, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information to add charges of felony murder, attempted robbery, and auto theft. Id. at 1229. The trial court denied the State’s motion.
On February 6, 1995, the State dismissed the murder charge against Davenport and refiled it, along with the three other charges of felony murder, attempted robbery and auto theft. The State then transferred the case to Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division 1. Id. Davenport filed a motion to dismiss the new charges, which the trial court denied. The case went to a jury trial, Davenport was convicted on all counts, and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of eighty eight years. Id. at 1228.
Here, the State was permitted on October 7, 2017, and February 20, 2018, to amend its charging information to expand the possible dates on which the single charged crime allegedly occurred. Then at the September 25, 2018, hearing on Tyrie’s motion to require the State to indicate the specific act with which he was charged, the State admitted the charging information was unclear, the prosecutor’s handling of the case had been “sloppy[,]” and the State intended to refile the case with three separate charges to “tidy” the record. (Tr. Vol. II at 5-6). On December 6, 2018, under a separate cause number, the State refiled the original charge and filed two additional charges of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. Both Cause 220 and Cause 1338 were filed in the same court with the same judge.
The procedural posture in the case at bar is different. Unlike the defendant in Davenport, Tyrie has not gone to trial. Because Tyrie has brought an interlocutory appeal, the trial court has not yet set a trial date, so the refiling of charges has not prejudiced Tyrie’s ability to defend himself against the original or additional charges. Additionally, the charges against Tyrie in Cause 1338 involve the same alleged victim and roughly the same time frame. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tyrie’s motion to dismiss the charges in Cause 1338. See Hollowell v. State, 773 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming denial of Hollowell’s motion to dismiss because State’s refiling and addition of charges was not prompted by an adverse ruling and Hollowell was “not forced to discard his prior preparation for trial and begin all over with different charges, strategies, and defenses”).
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tyrie’s motion to dismiss the charges under Cause 1338. Accordingly, we affirm and remand.
Affirmed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.