Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
In several opinions since 2014, this Court has made clear that a transgender person may obtain a change of name on government documents and a change of the gender marker on a birth certificate based only on a showing that the person is making the request in good faith and without a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. We have also repeatedly held that such petitioners are entitled to a waiver of the notice-by-publication requirement for their petitions and are likewise entitled to have their court records sealed to avoid the well-known potential for harm or harassment to which our transgender population has been subjected.
Notwithstanding this Court’s clear and binding case law on these issues, when R.E., a transgender male, petitioned the trial court to change his name and gender marker on government records, the court demanded that R.E. publish his petition in a local newspaper; litigate the petition in open court; and submit medical evidence to show that R.E. had actually undergone a physical sex change. Not only did the trial court fail to uphold and apply the law but the court disparaged and manifested a bias toward R.E. based upon R.E.’s gender.
We reverse and remand with instructions that the court grant R.E.’s petition for a name change and a change of his gender marker without further delay.
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It is apparent from the proceedings before the trial court that that court would not grant R.E.’s petition to change the gender marker on his birth certificate based on R.E.’s testimony alone but instead wanted some form of medical evidence that R.E. had actually undergone a physical sex change. [Footnote omitted.] In 2014, we considered another trial court’s similar belief and explicitly rejected it:
We recognize the trial court’s concern over what evidence is required to support such a petition. In its order, the court queried in part:
Can the court grant such a request merely because someone holds themselves out as a member of the other gender? If so, how long must they hold themselves out as a member of the other gender? Is gender reassignment surgery required? Is hormone therapy required? Is a medical opinion required?
The legislature is free to craft specific requirements. Without such guidance, however, it is our view that the ultimate focus should be on whether the petition is made in good faith and not for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose.
In re Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d at 709-10 (record citation and footnote omitted).
Thus, all R.E. had to show in order to obtain a change to the gender marker on his birth certificate was that his request was made in good faith and not for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. There is no question that R.E. met that threshold. Moreover, R.E.’s genuine desire to have all identifying documents conform to his current physical and social identity is apparent. See id. at 710.
The trial court’s insistence that R.E. could not meet his burden on his petition without medical evidence of an actual physical change to R.E.’s body, that R.E.’s “gender has actually been changed from female to male,” is contrary to law. No such evidence or enhanced burden of proof is required to grant R.E.’s petition. The trial court was actually aware of our opinion in In re Birth Certificate, as R.E. explicitly cited it to the court on multiple occasions. The opinions of this Court are binding upon our trial courts. S.R. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re M.W.), 130 N.E.3d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The trial court had no discretion to simply disregard our opinions. In its decision to deny R.E.’s petition to change his name on all identifying government documents and his gender marker on his birth certificate, the trial court erred as a matter of law. The decision of the trial court is reversed, and we remand with instructions for the trial court to grant R.E.’s petition to change his name on government-issued identifying documents and the gender marker on his birth certificate without further delay.
2. The trial court unreasonably refused to seal R.E.’s court records.
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Again, the trial court’s decision is clearly against this Court’s unambiguous precedent, and the trial court was specifically informed of the relevant case law. In In re A.L., we noted that, while court records are generally publicly accessible under Administrative Rule 9, there is
an exception providing that a court record that would otherwise be publicly accessible may be excluded from public access upon a verified written request demonstrating that “[a]cess or dissemination of the Court Record will create a significant risk of substantial harm to the requestor…
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Here, the trial court made the same errors that we reversed in In re A.L. and in In re M.E.B. when the court demanded that R.E. present some evidence of actual or imminent harm from the publication of his petition and the open court proceedings. Administrative Rule 9 requires no such evidence. R.E.’s testimony of the risk of harm faced by our transgender population is common knowledge and was easily sufficient to meet Administrative Rule 9’s requirements to waive publication and seal the court records. See id. (noting “the sobering statistics regarding the risk of harassment, violence, and homicide to the transgender population, both nationwide and in Indiana”). Moreover, the trial court’s October finding that this case had been open for “many months” and therefore should not be sealed was disingenuous—R.E. sought to seal the record from the outset, and it was the trial court’s refusal to do so that left the record open. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 58. The trial court again erred as a matter of law when it disregarded the unmistakable opinions of this Court on these issues and held R.E. to a burden that our case law does not support. The court’s judgment is reversed, and we remand with instructions that this case shall remain sealed.
3. The trial court treated R.E. inappropriately.
Finally, we are obliged to address the fact that the trial court failed to treat R.E. with the respect R.E. deserves and that we expect from fellow judicial officers. Unfortunately, this is not the first such occasion we have had to publicly admonish one of our trial courts for such derision…
That same admonishment applies here even more. The trial court acted contrary to law when it did not apply the proper legal standards to R.E.’s petition, forced R.E. to publish notice in a newspaper and out himself as a transgender person, and, instead of ruling on a simple petition in a timely manner, dragged out that petition through four proceedings over the better part of year. The court refused to use R.E.’s preferred pronoun, not only making it a point to use the incorrect pronoun “she” but also unacceptably referring to R.E. as “it” and “whichever.” Tr. Vol. II at 32. The trial court also ridiculed R.E.’s appearance, comparing R.E. to an “aunt that has a significant amount of facial hair.” Id. at 31.
All parties in Indiana’s trial courts deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. The trial court’s treatment of R.E. here was disrespectful and inappropriate. As we said in In re M.E.B., “[w]e would hope that the trial courts of this state would show far greater respect (as well as objectivity and impartiality) to all litigants appearing before them.” 126 N.E.3d at 934 n.1.
Conclusion
The trial court erred in at least the following respects: when the court required R.E. to publish notice of his petition; when the court refused to seal the record; and when the court required R.E. to produce medical evidence of an actual physical change to R.E.’s body. In doing so, the trial court obstructed the timely disposition of R.E.’s petition and placed evidentiary burdens upon R.E. that were unjustified and contrary to law. And the court failed to treat R.E. with the respect and dignity to which R.E. is entitled. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions that the court grant R.E.’s petition without further delay. The record of this case shall remain sealed.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.