Bailey, J.
Case Summary
This Court has accepted jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), to challenge the trial court’s sua sponte entry of “judgment on the evidence” in favor of Judith Hallie (“Hallie”), a defendant in a real estate foreclosure action. Wells Fargo presents the consolidated and restated issue of whether the trial court erroneously granted judgment to Hallie, based upon its determination that the sole witness presented by Wells Fargo was incompetent to authenticate the proffered evidentiary exhibits. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Thoma-Ball testified that she had been employed by Washington Mutual, “working defaulted loans,” until 2007 and then had worked for Wells Fargo for thirteen years. Id. at 8. Her employment as a business initiatives consultant included responsibility for reviewing loans in default and the related business records. She testified that Wells Fargo owned the mortgage loan for the Property, and she had reviewed Hallie’s loan file, payment history, Note, Mortgage, Assignment, demand letter, and collection notes. According to Thoma-Ball, she printed the payment history from Wells Fargo’s Mortgage Servicing Platform, the same type of reporting system used by Washington Mutual, but she had not personally made the entries.
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The trial court stated that its action was predicated upon its finding Thoma-Ball to be incompetent as a sponsoring witness for the documents proffered by Wells Fargo. There appears to have been no direct challenge to Thoma-Ball’s competency to testify. Rather, the trial court was apparently convinced that Thoma-Ball could not testify concerning any document generated in her absence. Moreover, the trial court did not directly address Wells Fargo’s contention that some documents, such as certified public records, were selfauthenticating. Absent admission of the relevant documents (other than the payoff statement), Wells Fargo could not support its foreclosure claim against Hallie. We thus address the propriety of the near-blanket exclusion of exhibits.
The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rolland v. State, 851 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
At trial, Hallie objected that the excluded documents were unauthenticated hearsay…
Upon remand, Wells Fargo may renew its assertion that some or all of its exhibits are not hearsay or fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. For example, Evidence Rule 803(6) concerns records of a regularly conducted activity, providing that such records are not excluded by the rule against hearsay…
To admit business records pursuant to Rule 803(6), the proponent of the exhibit must authenticate it. Speybroeck, 875 N.E.2d at 819. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides: “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
Evidence Rule 902 provides that some items of evidence are self-authenticating, that is, “they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted.” As relevant here, among the self-authenticating documents listed in Rule 902 are a copy of an official record or document recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law, if the copy is certified in compliance with law, and commercial paper, to the extent allowed by general commercial law. See id. at (4), (9). Self-authentication does not guarantee admissibility; rather, it relieves the proponent from providing foundational testimony. Speybroeck, 875 N.E.2d at 819. Evidence will be excluded if the source of information contained in the record or the circumstances of its preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Id.
On remand, Wells Fargo should be afforded the opportunity to offer exhibits eligible for self-authentication. Additionally, Wells Fargo should not be precluded from eliciting foundational testimony from a witness on grounds that the witness was not present at the time a document was created. The proponent of the business record exhibit may authenticate it by calling a witness “who has a functional understanding of the record keeping process of the business with respect to the specific entry, transaction, or declaration contained in the document.” Rolland, 851 N.E.2d at 1045. The witness must have “personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the document.” Speybroeck, 875 N.E.2d at 821. However, “[t]he witness need not have personally made or filed the record or have firsthand knowledge of the transaction represented by it in order to sponsor the exhibit.” Rolland, 851 N.E.2d at 1045. But the trial court imposed precisely this requirement here. The court abused its discretion in doing so and should not impose the requirement upon remand.
Conclusion
Wells Fargo has shown prima facie reversible error in the trial court’s purported entry of a “judgment on the evidence.” On remand, Wells Fargo should be permitted to proffer exhibits consistent with the Indiana Rules of Evidence, without a heightened personal knowledge requirement.
Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur