David, J.
Certain negligent acts or omissions on the part of a government employee have the potential to remove the shield of respondeat superior and expose the employee to personal liability. Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, there are only a handful of well-delineated pathways to accomplish this task. One of those paths is to show that the employee’s act or omission was “clearly outside the scope of the employee’s employment.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c)(2).
Here, Bryce Burton attempted to sue Indiana State Trooper Martin Benner in his personal capacity after the two were involved in an accident in rural Benton County. At the time of the accident, Trooper Benner was off duty but was operating his state issued police commission as allowed under State Police policy. Arguing he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, Benner sought summary judgment on whether he could be held personally liable for any damages that flowed from the incident. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Benner because though off duty, Benner was otherwise in substantial compliance with State Police policy in operating his commission and was therefore not clearly outside the scope of his employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, opining that reasonable minds could disagree whether the trooper was outside the scope of his employment and summary judgment was thus inappropriate.
We granted transfer and now find that, although there is some evidence that Trooper Benner was not in strict compliance with State Police policy at the time of the accident, this was not enough to place him “clearly outside” the scope of his employment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
…..
Because Trooper Benner raised an affirmative defense that he was immune from personal liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), the issue in this case is whether Benner was acting “clearly outside” the scope of his employment at the time of the accident such that he could be held personally liable for the injuries sustained by Burton. The State urges us to affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Benner on this issue, while Burton argues there is a genuine issue of material fact that should be decided by a jury.
….
Generally speaking, “whether an employee’s actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.” Knighten v. East Chicago Housing Authority, 45 N.E.3d 788, 794 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). When the facts are undisputed and “would not allow a jury to find that the tortious acts were within the scope of employment,” however, a court may conclude as a matter of law that the acts were not in the scope of employment. Cox v. Evansville, 107 N.E.3d 453, 460 (Ind. 2018).
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employee’s act or omission falls within the scope of employment if the injurious behavior is incidental to authorized conduct or furthers the employer’s business to an appreciable extent. Knighten, 45 N.E.3d at 792 (citation omitted). Conversely, “an employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.” Id. (quoting Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. 2008)). But “an employee’s wrongful act may still fall within the scope of his employment if his purpose was, to an appreciable extent, to further his employer’s business, even if the act was predominantly motivated by an intention to benefit the employee himself.” Id. Ultimately, we have found that “the scope of employment encompasses the activities that the employer delegates to employees or authorizes employees to do, plus employees’ acts that naturally or predictably arise from those activities.” Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 461
Viewing this lawsuit through the ITCA, the question becomes whether Trooper Benner was “clearly outside” the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. The State urges that Trooper Benner was within the scope of employment because, even though he was off duty, he was required by State Police policy to maintain radio contact, respond to emergencies, carry a firearm, and conform to a certain dress code. This, the State argues, furthers State Police business by providing an increased, more visible presence on the roads. Additionally, the State believes that if Benner’s acts arguably fell within the scope of his employment, then by definition the acts cannot be “clearly outside” the scope of his employment.
Burton, on the other hand, argues that Benner’s actions had no causal connection to his employment and any minimal compliance with State Police policy should not immunize the trooper from personal liability. Unlike cases where police misconduct occurred while officers were on duty, see Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 463-64, Burton urges this Court to find that no nexus of employment existed in this case because there was a complete divorce in time and activity between the end of Benner’s shift and the accident. For the reasons expressed below, we agree with the State that Benner’s involvement in the accident was not “clearly outside” the scope of his employment.
The undisputed evidence in this case indicates Trooper Benner complied with the vast majority of State Police procedures for operating his police commission while off duty. His “conduct [was] of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized” by the State Police, Bushong, 790 N.E.3d at 473 (quoting Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453), and included maintaining radio contact and conforming to a dress code. Additionally, as the trial court observed, Benner’s presence on the road and his ability to respond to nearby emergency situations undoubtably provided a benefit to the State Police through increased police presence on the roads. This ability to suddenly become available for official duties certainly “furthers his employer’s business.” Id. (citation omitted). Compare with Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 462 (“[T]ortious acts are not within the scope of employment when they flow from a course of conduct that is independent of activities that serve the employer”).
To the extent Burton argues Trooper Benner’s violation of traffic laws exposed him to personal liability under the ITCA, we disagree. [Footnote omitted.] True, State Police policy expressly prohibits violation of traffic laws, but in our view, the violation in this case did not move Benner “clearly outside” the scope of his employment. Recall that the scope of employment “may include acts that the employer expressly forbids” or “that violate the employer’s rules, orders, or instruction.” Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 461. While State Police policy forbids speeding in non-emergency situations, speeding could “naturally or predictably arise” from driving a commission even while off duty. See id. at 461-62. The “clearly outside” standard set forth in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5(c)(2) represents a high bar and, in this case, we are not convinced that bar has been cleared.
To be sure, there is no precise formula to determine whether an act is “clearly outside” the scope of employment. There could certainly be circumstances that would oblige such a finding, but given the evidence presented in this case, we cannot say Trooper Benner was acting clearly outside the scope of his employment.
Conclusion
We find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Trooper Benner was acting “clearly outside” the scope of his employment. As such, the trial court properly granted Benner’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur