Barnes, S.J.
Jerry Young appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We vacate and remand in part and affirm in part.
Young presents two issues for our review, which we restate as: I. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Young’s claim that his stipulation to habitual offender enhancements was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he did not personally waive his right to a jury trial. II. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Young’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
On direct appeal, this Court found the trial court erred by merging Young’s convictions for rape and criminal deviate conduct and by applying two enhancements to the single conviction. We thus remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct. In addition, the trial court was instructed to attach Young’s habitual offender enhancement to his rape conviction and to attach his repeat sexual offender enhancement to his criminal deviate conduct conviction. The two enhanced sentences were to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of eighty years. See id. On remand, the trial court followed our sentencing directive. In June 2017, Young filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended by counsel… On May 7, 2019, the court issued its order denying Young’s petition. This appeal ensued.
…
Young contends that his stipulation to the repeat sexual offender and habitual criminal offender sentencing enhancements constitutes a guilty plea and that this plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he did not personally waive his right to a jury trial.
First, we must determine whether Young’s acknowledgement concerning the habitual enhancements was a guilty plea or merely a stipulation. The postconviction court concluded that Young’s stipulation was “essentially a guilty plea.”
Young’s stipulation established the existence of his prior convictions, established that the prior convictions were unrelated, and confirmed that Young “is a Repeat Sexual Offender” and “is a Habitual Criminal Offender.” Appealed Order, pp. 7, 8. Young’s status was proved by his admissions contained in the stipulation, and there was nothing left to be determined. Moreover, the trial court accepted the stipulation, stating that it interpreted the stipulation as Young’s admission to being both a repeat sexual offender and an habitual criminal offender. The court then specifically asked Young’s counsel if she had any objections to the court’s interpretation, and she replied in the negative. Young’s stipulation was the equivalent of a guilty plea.
Having concluded that Young’s stipulation amounted to a guilty plea, we turn to whether it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Young specifically asserts the lack of his personal waiver of a jury trial. In support of his argument, Young cites Saylor v. State, 55 N.E.3d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, in which this Court held that when a defendant pleads guilty to an habitual offender enhancement, he must personally waive his right to a jury trial on the enhancement. Id. at 366. For its part, the State acknowledges Saylor and simply states that it was wrongly decided
As evidenced by the trial transcript, Young did not personally waive his right to a jury trial on the repeat sexual offender and habitual criminal offender enhancements. Accordingly, we vacate the adjudications on these enhancements and remand this case for a new trial on the repeat sexual offender and habitual criminal offender enhancements.
…
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we vacate Young’s habitual offender adjudications and remand for a new trial on those enhancements. We further conclude the postconviction court properly denied Young’s petition as to his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.