Crone, J.
Cliffton W. Davis was operating a vehicle in Kosciusko County when he exited a roundabout without signaling a turn. A police officer, believing that Davis’s behavior constituted a traffic infraction, initiated a stop of Davis’s vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle led to the discovery of incriminating evidence and the filing of criminal charges against Davis. Davis filed a motion to suppress that evidence which the trial court granted based upon its conclusion that Davis’s failure to signal while exiting the roundabout was not a statutory violation, and therefore the stop of Davis’s vehicle was unlawful. The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s order, asserting that the failure to signal when exiting a roundabout is a statutory violation, and even if it is not, the police officer’s mistake of law in this case was reasonable and therefore the stop was constitutionally valid. For reasons that we will explain fully in our discussion, we affirm the trial court’s suppression order.
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In this appeal, we must resolve what we perceive to be a vexing question for many Hoosier drivers: Does a motorist violate current Indiana traffic regulation law by not signaling a turn when exiting a roundabout? In short, the answer is no.
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Indiana law defines “roundabout” as “a circular intersection or junction in which road traffic flows almost continuously in one (1) direction around a central island.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-157.5. Other than defining roundabouts, our legislature has enacted few traffic regulation statutes that expressly address roundabouts. For instance, our legislature has mandated that “[a]vehicle passing around a roundabout shall be driven only to the right of the roundabout’s central island.” Ind. Code § 9-21-8-10. Moreover, our legislature has reserved the right-of-way in roundabouts for vehicles with a total length of at least forty feet or a total width of at least ten feet. Ind. Code § 9-21-8-10.5. This is where this roundabout guidance, both literally and figuratively, begins and ends.
We agree with the State that when motorists are entering a roundabout, they are simply following the roadway and continuing along the natural flow of the road, similar to when coming upon a curve in the road. Accordingly, it would be nonsensical to read the current turn signal statute as requiring motorists to activate their right-turn signals when entering a roundabout, especially if they simply mean to travel in a continuous lane and move through the roundabout. In that circumstance, the driver is not making a choice between alternatives that other motorists need to be alerted to for safety purposes; the driver is neither turning nor changing lanes, so there is nothing to signal.
However, when the act of exiting a roundabout, as involved here, is considered, application of our current signaling law becomes even more problematic. As noted by the State, exiting a roundabout requires the driver to deviate from the natural circular flow of the roundabout. The driver must make a choice between various points of exit, a choice to which other motorists should arguably be notified. But, based upon our current turn signal law, how and when would a motorist be required to signal his exit from a roundabout? This simple question only generates more questions which demonstrate that our current turn signal statute is completely unworkable in this context.
Must a motorist signal when exiting the roundabout intersection, even when he has traveled straight through and is proceeding in the same direction on the same street upon which he entered? Would that be considered a “turn,” or does a “turn” occur only when a motorist chooses to take an exit onto a different street? Does exiting a roundabout, which often involves the driver simply veering to the right, involve a “turn,” or does it depend upon the angle of the exit and the degree to which the driver must rotate his steering wheel? See United States v. Smith, 668 F.3d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25 does not define “turning” but concluding based upon common dictionary definition that a “roughly 120-degree right” turn was a sufficient “rotat[ion]” to constitute a turn). Must a motorist always use a right signal when exiting a roundabout, or is a left signal required in some circumstances? Moreover, it would only make sense from a safety standpoint for a motorist to signal a turn, whether it be right or left, immediately upon passing the exit just prior to the desired exit. However, our current law requires motorists to signal continuously during not less than the last 200 feet traveled before turning or changing lanes. The State concedes in its brief that the turn signal statute cannot be read as requiring drivers to signal a turn prior to entering a roundabout. As a consequence, the statute as written does not apply. We can say with confidence that the entrances and exits of most roundabouts are much less than 200 feet apart, so it would be impossible to comply with the statute in those circumstances.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we observe that it is for the Indiana General Assembly, and not this Court, to promulgate specific rules and regulations regarding the use of turn signals in roundabouts, and we encourage it to do so. Because Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-25 is inapplicable to roundabouts, we hold that Davis did not violate that statute when he did not signal a turn when exiting the roundabout in this case.
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The State maintains that, even assuming Officer Minear was mistaken in his belief that Davis violated Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-25, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable. In other words, the State argues that it was objectively reasonable for an officer in Officer Minear’s position to think that Davis’s failure to signal his exit from the roundabout was a violation of Indiana law. However, based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court concluded that the State failed to prove that Officer Minear’s mistake in this case was objectively reasonable, and therefore Officer Minear lacked reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. 8 When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations, neither reweighing the evidence nor reassessing the credibility of the witness. Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 335. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination on this issue. See Clemons v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that whether a belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances is a question of fact). In sum, the State has not met its burden to show that the trial court’s grant of Davis’s motion to suppress evidence was contrary to law. Therefore, we affirm the suppression order
Affirmed
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.