David, J.
Indiana law provides that a trial court must dismiss a petition alleging a child is in need of services if the court does not conclude a factfinding hearing within 120 days of the filing of the petition by the State. Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1(d). Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, however, allow a party to move for a continuance if that party can show “good cause” for why a continuance is necessary in a particular case. Ind. Trial Rule 53.5. The issue presented in this case is whether the legislature’s 120-day constraint on a CHINS proceeding may be enlarged under our trial rules if a party to the proceeding—in this case the Mother—moves for a good faith continuance that results in the conclusion of factfinding beyond the codified 120-day limit. Finding that this time period may be extended only for good cause, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion to dismiss the CHINS petition.
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We are asked to consider whether a party to a CHINS proceeding may move for a continuance that places the action outside of the legislatively prescribed timeframe and then seek dismissal because the codified deadline has expired. Here, Mother moved for a continuance, albeit for good cause, to resolve a discovery dispute and sort through more than 2,000 different video recordings. In her motion to dismiss, however, Mother argued that the statute is clear: CHINS proceedings must be dismissed if factfinding is not concluded within the prescribed time limit. On the other side of this dispute, DCS argues that such a rigid interpretation would lead to a Catch-22. Stated differently, DCS believes the trial court faced two choices: either rush through the case without important evidence or allow the parties to build their case and risk dismissal for failure to complete the hearing within the statutory timeframe.
We begin our analysis with the statute governing the amount of time a court may take to complete a factfinding hearing in a CHINS case. In relevant part, Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 provides…we have not yet had the opportunity to review the statute’s procedural timeline…
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These cases are instructive though not controlling. We agree, for example, that the sixty-day deadline may be waived with the consent of both parties for any reason. See Matter of J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655. Further, we accept that the General Assembly has made CHINS actions a priority by placing time constraints on these proceedings and has provided a mechanism for dismissal if the requirements are not met. See Matter of T.T., 110 N.E.3d at 443. However, we do not think that the trial court acted contrary to law in denying Mother’s motion to dismiss for several reasons—each interrelated.
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Second, it bears repeating that CHINS proceedings are civil in nature. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253). For its part, the General Assembly has codified significant procedural and substantive provisions outlining the purposes and procedures of CHINS proceedings. See id. at 1209-10; Ind. Code art. 31-34. In addition to codified law, all parties to a CHINS proceeding are subject to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. Ind. Code § 31-34-9-7. But “to the extent a statute is at odds with our [Rules of Trial Procedure], the rule governs” on matters of procedure. Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1099 (Ind. 2018) (citation omitted). To be at odds or “in conflict…, it is not necessary that the statutory rule be in direct opposition to our rule, so that but one could stand per se.” State v. Bridenhager, 257 Ind. 699, 704, 279 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972). “The rule and the statute need only be incompatible to the extent that both could not apply in a given situation.” Bowyer v. Ind. Dept. of Nat. Res., 798 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind. 2003).
We think that here, Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 is procedural because it includes mechanisms for extending the time by which factfinding hearings should be completed in CHINS proceedings. See generally State ex rel. Gaston v. Gibson Circuit Court, 462 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ind. 1984) (finding a statute that provided parties with the procedural mechanism and timeframe to request a change of judge was procedural in nature). While section 31-34-11-1 provides a hard 120-day deadline, Rule 53.5 provides, “Upon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.” Thus, both the statute and Trial Rule 53.5 could not apply in the present situation because one mandates dismissal and the other allows for good cause extension of the timeframe.
Because our trial rules trump statutes on matters of procedure, Rule 53.5 allows extension of the 120-day deadline in Indiana Code section 31- 34-11-1(b) provided a party can show “good cause.” Where, as here, the circumstances dictate good cause for a continuance, Trial Rule 53.5 controls and a trial court has discretion to grant a continuance without the risk of mandatory dismissal for failure to complete the factfinding hearing within 120 days.
Allowing a “good cause” continuance beyond the 120-day deadline not only provides fairness for the parties involved but also allows the legislature’s intent to “prevail[] over the strict literal meaning of any word or term.” State v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003)). See also Matter of J.S., 130 N.E.3d 109, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (same). We have consistently observed the principle that “the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1209 (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258). Accordingly, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in ruling on motions for continuances, including determining whether the moving parties have shown good cause for requesting a continuance. See F.M. v. N.B, 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1039-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a request for a continuance if good cause has been shown). There are no “mechanical tests” for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause. See Blackford v. Boone County Area Plan Com’n, 43 N.E.3d 655, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a continuance turns on the circumstances present in a particular case, id., and the circumstances of this particular case justified the trial court’s decision. [FN 3: We urge our trial courts to carefully consider whether parties have truly shown good cause for an extension of time. This may, at minimum, require a hearing to determine whether good cause has been shown. But to create a clean record, we urge trial courts to make a finding, on the record, that good cause has been shown for an extension of time. See James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Ind. 1999) (emphasizing the importance of making a record for appellate review)]
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In light of these observations, we hold that Trial Rule 53.5 allows a party to move for a good cause continuance under Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b). Unlike subsection (a) of the same statute which allows an extension of time by agreement of the parties for any reason, a party seeking to extend a CHINS action beyond 120 days must show good cause. Given the General Assembly’s signal that these cases should be completed within a certain deadline, we expect that cases like the present one will be few and far between. However, Trial Rule 53.5 gives trial courts the necessary flexibility to ensure fairness in these types of proceedings and effectuate legislative intent.
Conclusion
We hold today that, unlike the sixty-day deadline imposed by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a) that may be waived by consent of the parties, the 120-day deadline contemplated by subsection 31-34-11-1(b) may be enlarged only if a party shows good cause for a continuance. Because Mother showed good cause for a continuance, the trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s motion to dismiss the pending CHINS action after the 120-day deadline expired. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.