Riley, J.
Appellant-Defendant, Jermone Davis (Davis), appeals his conviction and sentence for one Count of corrupt business influence, a Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 35-45-6-2(1); one Count of conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug of 10 grams or more, a Level 2 felony, I.C. §§ 35-41-5-2; -48-4-1(e)(1); and one Count of conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine of at least 10 grams or more, a Level 2 felony, I.C. §§ 35-41-5-2; -48-4-1.1(e)(1).
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Davis raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as the following: (1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Davis of his conspiracy convictions for dealing in a narcotic drug and dealing in methamphetamine; (2) Whether Davis’ conspiracy convictions violated Indiana’s double jeopardy principles under the actual evidence test; and (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing.
III. Consecutive Sentences
Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4.5 provides that “A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half (17 ½ ) years.”
The trial court sentenced Davis to consecutive sentences of eighteen years for each of his Level 2 felony conspiracy drug conviction, and an additional six years for his Level 5 felony corrupt business practices conviction. However, the trial court suspended six years of the Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine for an executed sentence of thirty-six years.
Davis’ sole argument here, is that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for his conspiracy drug convictions, and in support of his argument, he directs us to Beno v. State, 581 N.E.2d 922 (Ind.1991), and Hendrickson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
In Beno, the police arranged for a confidential informant to purchase cocaine from Beno at his residence on two different occasions. Beno, 581 N.E.2d at 923. Beno was then convicted of two Counts of dealing in cocaine and one Count of maintaining a common nuisance. Id. at 924. During the sentencing hearing, Beno was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment on each of the three convictions with each term to be served consecutively, for a total of seventy-four years imprisonment. Id. After accepting transfer, our supreme court determined Beno’s sentence to be manifestly unreasonable. Specifically, it found that, although the trial court properly sentenced Beno to the maximum term on each Count, the trial court erroneously ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court noted that, although a trial court has discretion to impose both maximum and consecutive sentences, where a defendant is enticed by the police to commit nearly identical crimes as a result of a police sting operation, consecutive sentences are inappropriate. Id.
In Hendrickson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the police conducted five controlled buys over a period of two months in which Hendrickson sold marijuana, methadone, and two different legend drugs. After the trial court imposed consecutive sentences, we revised the sentences to concurrent terms on appeal. Id. In so doing, we explained, “the purpose of Beno in prohibiting consecutive sentences when the police entice additional drug buys, applies whether or not different drugs are involved. Therefore, we conclude that the holding in Beno is applicable even if the defendant provides a different type of drug during additional buys.” Id.
Although not cited by Davis, we find Gregory v. State, 644 N.E.2d 543, 544 (Ind. 1994) instructive in our analysis. In Gregory, Gregory sold cocaine to an informant on four separate occasions during a ten-day period. Id. As the result of the government sting operation, Gregory was convicted of four Counts of selling cocaine to the same police informant. Id. The trial court sentenced Gregory to the presumptive term of thirty years on each Count and ordered each Count to be served consecutively. Id. Our supreme court addressed whether the consecutive sentences were manifestly unreasonable and held that “[c]onsecutive sentences are not appropriate when the State sponsors a series of virtually identical offenses.” Id. Specifically, the court held:
As in Beno, Gregory sold the same drug to the same informant on several occasions over a short period of time. Presumably, the police could have set up any number of additional transactions, each time adding an additional [C]ount against Gregory. While the police may find it necessary to conduct a series of buys, the trial court should be leery of sentencing a defendant to consecutive terms for each [C]ount. We hold that on these facts, a sentence of 120 years was inappropriate.
Id. at 546.
What is more, in Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we held that the principle that “the State may not ‘pile on’ sentences by postponing prosecution in order to gather more evidence . . . applies equally to convictions arising from evidence gathered as a direct result of the State sponsored criminal activity.” And, more recently, our supreme court took the same approach in holding that consecutive sentences were inappropriate where controlled buys led to a search and additional drug-related convictions. Eckelbarger v. State, 51 N.E.3d 169, 170 (Ind. 2016).
…
Similar to the defendants in Beno, Hendrickson, and Gregory, Davis was enticed by the police to make drug sales as part of a sting operation. While the drug buys happened over two years apart, which was not in close temporal proximity as the four days at issue in Beno, 581 N.E.2d at 923, or the two-month period in Hendrickson, 690 N.E.2d at 766, or the ten days at issue in Gregory, 644 N.E.2d at 544, the clear import we gather from Gregory, Jones, and Williams, is that they require that the “sentences for each conviction arising from evidence seized after the State began sponsoring the criminal activity to run concurrently.” Williams, 891 N.E.2d at 635. Under these circumstances, we find that Davis’ consecutive sentences are not appropriate. See id.
“When we find an irregularity in the trial court’s sentencing decision, we may remand to the trial court for a clarification or a new sentencing determination, or affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or impose a proper sentence.” Rios v. State, 930 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In the instant case, we elect to impose a proper sentence pursuant to the cases cited, and order that Davis serve concurrent eighteen-year terms on the conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug and methamphetamine convictions with no sentence suspended. All other aspects of his sentence, including the six-year sentence for his Level 5 felony corrupt business influence conviction, are affirmed, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to enter a new sentencing order consistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Davis’ conspiracy convictions and his conspiracy convictions did not violate double jeopardy principles under the actual evidence test. However, we reverse his consecutive sentences as to the Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in heroin and methamphetamine convictions, finding them inappropriate, and remand to the trial court to issue a new sentencing order consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur