Darden, S.J.
A jury found Cody E. Reynolds (“Cody”) guilty of child molestation, a Level 4 felony; and vicarious sexual gratification, a Level 6 felony. Cody appeals the trial court’s judgment of conviction for both offenses, and his sentence for child molestation. We affirm.
Cody raises four issues, which we restate as: I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Cody’s challenges for cause of two jurors. II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a video recording of the child victim’s forensic interview along with the child victim’s trial testimony and live testimony by the interviewer. III. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Cody’s convictions. IV. Whether Cody’s sentence for child molestation is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
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II. Admissibility of Forensic Interview and Interviewer’s Testimony
Cody asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence both the recording of Freiburger’s forensic interview with H.W. and Freiburger’s testimony about the interview, claiming the trial court violated the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009). The State argues that Cody waived his challenge to the admissibility of Freiburger’s testimony. After reviewing the record, we disagree. We will address the admissibility of both the recorded interview and Freiburger’s testimony.
[Pursuant to the protected person statute (PPS)] the trial court held a hearing prior to trial and determined H.W.’s prior statement was admissible. Cody does not present any claims of error arising from the pretrial hearing. Another relevant requirement of Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6(e) is that the protected person must testify at trial or be found unavailable to testify for specific reasons not relevant here.
Although the PPS explicitly indicates that both a protected person’s live testimony and prior statement may be introduced at trial, Cody argues that it is inappropriate to admit H.W.’s live testimony, along with the recording of H.W.’s interview and Freiburger’s testimony, citing Tyler v. State. In that case, Tyler was accused of sexual misconduct involving five children he was babysitting. The five children subsequently participated in separate recorded interviews. At trial, all five children testified, and three of the children’s videotaped interviews were admitted into evidence under the PPS.
Considering the purposes of the PPS and the potential harm resulting from the admission of duplicative evidence, the Supreme Court determined: “We hold that if the statements are consistent and both are otherwise admissible, testimony of a protected person may be presented in open court or by prerecorded statement through the PPS, but not both except as authorized under the Rules of Evidence.”
The State argues that the trial court did not err in admitting the recording along with H.W.’s live testimony because the Indiana Rules of Evidence authorized the admission. We disagree.
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To summarize, the Rules of Evidence do not otherwise support the admission of the recorded forensic interview into evidence, and admission of the recording into evidence along with H.W.’s live testimony contravenes the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Tyler. But our analysis does not end there. The admission of evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis.
In this case, the recorded interview was merely cumulative of in-court testimony by H.W. and Tricia. Further, Tricia’s testimony added another piece of circumstantial evidence: during the relevant time period, she came home from work and found Cody asleep on the couch with his pants down around his ankles, with a pillow covering his genitals. We therefore conclude, as did our Supreme Court, that the effect of the admission of the recorded interview herein was “insignificant” and we do not find it amounted to reversible error. See Tyler, 903 N.E.2d at 467 (no reversible error in admission of recorded interviews; any prejudicial effect was outweighed by the children’s live testimony).
Turning to Freiburger’s [the interviewer] testimony…a panel of this Court determined [in Taylor v. State, 841 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)] the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony by the interviewer, noting: (1) the forensic interview occurred four days after the initial disclosure; (2) the interview lasted twenty minutes; (3) the interviewer did not ask leading questions, and the victim’s mother was not present; and (4) the interview occurred before a sexual assault examination.
Here, Freiburger interviewed H.W. four days after she disclosed the sexual abuse to her mother. The interview lasted only thirty minutes. Tricia did not participate in or observe the interview. Freiburger testified that her interview protocol requires letting the child lead the interview and avoiding direct questions. She further explained that she followed the above protocol by allowing H.W. to narrate what happened and expressed no credibility as to H.W.’s statements made during or after the interview. Finally, the record fails to indicate whether H.W. underwent a sexual assault examination, and whether it happened before her forensic interview. Under the circumstances, and following the holding in Taylor, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Freiburger’s testimony concerning the forensic interview.
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Tavitas, J., concur