Mathias, J.
J.H. (“Mother) and W.D. (“Father”) (collectively “the Parents”) appeal the order of the Marion Superior Court terminating their parental rights to their minor child C.D. (“Daughter”). Mother presents two issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights is clearly erroneous, and (2) whether the termination of Mother’s parental rights should be reversed because it deprives the Parents of their right to determine adoptive placement for Daughter. Father appeals and presents two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the termination of Father’s parental rights should be reversed because the trial court ignored the Parent’s right to determine an appropriate adoptive placement for Daughter.
We affirm.
….
Lastly, both Parents argue that they have a fundamental right to choose who will adopt Daughter and that, by terminating their parental rights, the trial court effectively refused to place Daughter with Grandmother, contrary to the desires of the Parents, DCS, and the GAL.
We agree that parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. As explained by our supreme court in In re G.Y…
Under normal circumstances, a child’s parents have the right to determine whether their child will be adopted and by whom she will be adopted. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2) (providing that a petition to adopt a child may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed by the mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father who has established paternity). But parental rights are not absolute. And, here, Mother and Father’s parental rights have been terminated. Their argument regarding their right to consent to adoption puts the “cart before the horse.” That is, termination cannot be improper because it deprived the Parents of their right to consent to Daughter’s adoption. Termination is proper because they failed to address their substance abuse problems and because termination is in Daughter’s best interests. The result of this is that all of Mother and Father’s parental rights, including the right to consent to adoption, have been terminated. This fact is not grounds for reversing the termination, it is a consequence of the termination. [Footnote omitted.]
The Parents also argue that the trial court erred by failing to permit Grandmother to adopt Daughter, contrary to the wishes of the Parents, DCS, and the GAL. But the question before the trial court in the termination action was not who should be allowed to adopt Daughter. The question before the termination court was whether the Parent’s parental rights should be terminated. Who will ultimately be permitted to adopt Daughter is a question for the adoption court, not the termination court. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (“[I]t is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether a particular adoptive placement is appropriate.”); see also In re D.J., 755 N.E.2d 679, 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting, in response to mother’s concerns regarding foster family adopting children following the termination of her parental rights, that “if the foster family desires to adopt the children, the home will have to be approved as an appropriate and suitable environment for the children.”), trans. denied. The same is true here, and the question of who is the more suitable adoptive party for Daughter will be determined by the adoption court.
Conclusion
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of the Parents’ parental rights. And the rights that the Parents possessed, including the right to consent to the adoption of Daughter, were rightly terminated. Thus, the Parents no longer have a fundamental right to consent to the adoption of Daughter, and the question of the proper adoptive home for Daughter is a question for the adoption court.
Affirmed. Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.