Riley, J.
Appellant-Defendant, Joseph Smith (Smith), appeals following his conviction for rape, a Level 1 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1); criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a); strangulation, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42- 2-9(c); and domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
Smith presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following: (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded certain evidence, preventing Smith from exercising his right to present a full defense; and (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Smith’s motion for mistrial.
I. Exclusion of Evidence
Smith contends that the trial court erred when it excluded J.R.’s Post-Assault Sexual History from the evidence.
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Smith sought to have J.R.’s Post-Assault Sexual History admitted pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 412, commonly referred to as the Rape Shield Rule. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 463 (Ind. 2015). Rule 412 prohibits the admission of any evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition in a criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. Ind. Evidence Rule 412(a)(1)-(2). The purpose of the Rule is to prevent the victim of a sexual assault from being placed on trial and to remove impediments to reporting sex crimes.
However, Rule 412’s prohibition on evidence of the victim’s other sexual behavior or predisposition is not absolute. The Rule provides exceptions in relevant part as follows: (1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: (A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; [and] **** (C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Evid. R. 412(b)(1)(A), (C). In addition, even when evidence falls within one of these exceptions and is admissible, it must still be relevant and admissible under Evidence Rules 401 and 403.
Smith argues that the evidence was admissible to foreclose “the possibility of him being the cause of J.R.’s vaginal injury,” its exclusion deprived him of his constitutional right to present a full defense, and that any irregularities present in J.R.’s medical records went to its weight, not its admissibility.
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Smith urges that the J.R.’s Post-Assault Sexual History was relevant to prove that someone other than he caused the injury to J.R.’s vagina. [Footnote omitted.] However, the State did not introduce evidence of the injury to J.R.’s vagina at trial, and, therefore, there was nothing for Smith to rebut with the Post-Assault Sexual History evidence. Thus, the exception did not apply.
Smith also argues that the evidence was admissible under the Rule’s exception that provides for the admission of “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”
Smith argues that the evidence was probative of his defense theory because J.R. could have had sexual contact with Perry after the offenses in order to prevent him from leaving her. However, the trial court found that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403, which provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. We agree with the trial court. Even if the evidence was probative of Smith’s defense, its probative value was greatly outweighed by the increased chance that J.R.’s sexuality would be put on trial and become the focus of the defense, which is precisely what Rule 412 is meant to prohibit. See Conrad, 938 N.E.2d at 855; see also Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200 (affirming exclusion of evidence that would have shifted jury’s attention away from the defendant’s actions to those of the victim). Because Smith’s constitutional right to present a defense was still required to comport with the Rules of Evidence and the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403, we conclude that his right to present a defense was not unfairly curtailed. Marley, 747 N.E.2d at 1132.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of J.R.’s Post-Assault Sexual History or when it denied Smith’s motion for mistrial.
Affirmed.
Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur