Crone, J.
Case Summary
This interlocutory appeal involves circumstances in which a trial court’s continuing equitable authority over injunctions clashes with freedom of contract principles. The limited issue to be resolved is whether the trial court has the legal authority to rule on the merits of an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion to supplement/modify an agreed permanent injunction entered by the parties to a boundary dispute and approved by the court. The trial court concluded that it possesses such authority, and we affirm.
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In framing the nature of the dispute below, we note that Novicki filed a motion for relief from the 2017 agreed injunction that she entered with the Hesses. Trial Rule 60(B)(7) allows relief from judgment where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]” “[T]o establish that it is no longer equitable for a final judgment to have prospective application under Rule 60(B)(7), the movant must show that there has been a change in circumstances since the entry of the original judgment and that the change of circumstances was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of entry of the original judgment.” City of Indianapolis v. Tichy, 122 N.E.3d 841, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
In this interlocutory appeal, the Hesses claim that the trial court erred in declaring that it possesses the legal authority to grant Novicki’s motion to supplement/modify the agreed permanent injunction should Novicki meet her burden under Trial Rule 60(B)(7) and in denying their motion to reconsider. Ordinarily, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to appeals involving the trial court’s denial of a motion to reconsider or its ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. v. United Equip. Leasing, LLC, 10 N.E.3d 91, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (ruling on motion to reconsider), trans. denied (2015); TacCo Falcon Point, Inc. v. Atlantic Ltd. P’ship XII, 937 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling on Rule 60(B) motion). Here, however, our review involves only the preliminary question of whether the trial court has the legal authority to address the merits of Novicki’s Rule 60(B)(7) claim; as such, we are faced with a pure question of law, which we review de novo. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011).
The Hesses assert that because the injunction was entered as an agreed judgment, it is a matter of contract, not subject to modification by the trial court. We acknowledge the well-established principle that “[a]fter entering an agreed judgment, the trial court has no authority to modify or change the judgment in any essential or material manner.” Evans v. Evans, 946 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [Footnote omitted.]
In contrast, Novicki contends that this action must be resolved by application of injunction law rather than contract law…
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Here, our charge is to answer only the first question, that is, whether the trial court possesses the legal authority to modify the agreed injunction. The dispute between Novicki and the Hesses is not limited to remedial matters such as the payment of money damages for a past wrong. The agreed injunction concerns prospective matters such as the positioning of the parties’ docks/lifts and the continued navigation of their respective watercrafts within the inlet, all of which must be considered in conjunction with the rules and regulations promulgated by the CSCD, the owners and regulators of the lake. Even when viewed from a purely contractual standpoint, the agreement’s terms suggest that the parties may have anticipated potential future judicial intervention. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 54 (paragraph 4: “if the same is not permitted by CSCD rules in effect at the time.”). Like the Swift court, we have no doubt that this injunction, though entered by consent, is subject to the trial court’s continuing equitable authority. 286 U.S. at 114.
This is not to say that Novicki is entitled to such modification. [Footnote omitted.] See id., at 114- 15 (concluding that court undoubtedly has equitable authority to modify injunction, even though entered by consent, to adapt to changed conditions, yet holding evidence insufficient to justify court’s exercise of power to modify). That question will be considered and resolved during the second phase of the proceedings, under a more complete factual record. Should Novicki present sufficient evidence establishing that the agreed injunction has become an instrument of wrong due to changed circumstances and thus is no longer equitable, the trial court, in its discretion, may grant her relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7). Ballard, 737 N.E.2d at 417. If she fails to meet her burden of proving an unforeseeable change in circumstances rendering the injunction inequitable, the trial court will nevertheless retain the authority to interpret and apply the language of the agreed judgment according to contract principles to determine whether an ambiguity exists and to ascertain the intent of the parties. Ingoglia, 530 N.E.2d at 1200. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.