Najam, J.
Jason L. Anderson appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Anderson raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether Anderson invited any error in the delay in his sentencing on Count II when, in his plea agreement, he affirmatively agreed to a delay of up to nearly ten years for that sentencing.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it relied on the whole of Anderson’s plea agreement to reject his argument that he had been twice sentenced on Count I.
3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the revocation of Anderson’s probation.
We affirm.
In September of 2000, the State charged Anderson with three counts of dealing in cocaine, two as Class A felonies and one as a Class B felony. In February of 2001, Anderson entered into a written plea agreement with the State regarding those three charges, which agreement the trial court later accepted.
According to the agreement:
[7(A)]. [Anderson] will ple[a]d guilty under Count I[] to the lesser included offense of Dealing in Cocaine as [a] Class B Felony[] and to Count II, Dealing in Cocaine, as charged as a Class A Felony, respectively;
B. As to Count I, the State will recommend and [Anderson] will not oppose[] a sentence of ten (10) years incarceration at the Indiana Department of Correction[], of which ten (10) years will be suspended and served as follows:
i. The first five (5) years of the suspended sentence portion shall be served through the LaPorte County Community Corrections Work Release Program. * * *
ii. The second five (5) years of the suspended portion shall be served . . . under the Court’s Order of Probation . . . . * * *
D. As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically waives his right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be continued for sentencing . . . as set forth below:
i. If, on March 17, 2011, [Anderson] has complied with all terms and conditions of Probation and Work Release, the State will move to dismiss;
ii. However, if[,] at the time of the sentencing hearing, or anytime before, on motion of the State or Probation, the Court determines that [Anderson] has violated the conditions of Work Release or Probation, then the parties will proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized by [law] on Count I [sic1 ], Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A felony.
E. The State will dismiss Count III[, dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony]. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17-18 (italics removed).
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In 2004, while Anderson was serving his probation pursuant to his plea agreement, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation. Thereafter, Anderson admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked Anderson’s probation and ordered him to serve ten years in the Department of Correction on Count I, the Class B felony, and a concurrent term of twenty years on Count II, the Class A felony.
In November of 2011, Anderson moved to modify his sentence. The court granted his motion and ordered him to serve six months in the LaPorte County Jail followed by work release for eighteen months. Thereafter, if compliant, Anderson would be permitted to serve “the remainder of [his] term” on probation. Id. at 24.
In 2017, while Anderson was serving his term of probation pursuant to the court’s 2011 order, the State filed a second petition to revoke Anderson’s probation.
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Anderson moved to dismiss the State’s second petition to revoke his probation. According to Anderson, his current term of probation was based on paragraph 7(D)(ii) of his plea agreement, that paragraph references “Count I,” Anderson had already served his sentence on Count I, and, thus, the court was without jurisdiction to place him on probation pursuant to the plea agreement. After a fact-finding hearing, the trial court denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss and found that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged by the State. The court then ordered Anderson to serve ten years in the Department of Correction.
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The trial court’s delay in sentencing Anderson on Count II resulted from the plain terms of Anderson’s own plea agreement. The agreement could not be more clear on precisely this point: “As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically waives his right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be continued for sentencing” up to “March 17, 2011.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 18. Anderson’s complaint on appeal that the trial court erred when it “created a delay in sentencing for more than ten years” as to Count II simply disregards the fact that the delay was the product of his own affirmative agreement. Appellant’s Br. at 10. Any error in the delay was invited by Anderson and is not available for appellate review.
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Anderson next relies on an obvious typographical error to assert that the court erred when it placed him on probation. Specifically, Anderson complains about the italicized language below from his plea agreement:
D. As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically waives his right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be continued for sentencing . . . as set forth below:
- If, on March 17, 2011, [Anderson] has complied with all terms and conditions of Probation and Work Release, the State will move to dismiss;
- ii. However, if[,] at the time of the sentencing hearing, or anytime before, on motion of the State or Probation, the Court determines that [Anderson] has violated the conditions of Work Release or Probation, then the parties will proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized by [law] on Count I, Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A felony.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 18 (emphasis [original]). According to Anderson, the italicized reference to Count I above means that the trial court had no authority to either sentence him to probation on Count II, because that is not what is written, or on Count I, in that, by that time, Anderson had served his sentence on Count I. In effect, Anderson continues, his placement on probation sentences him twice on Count I.
Anderson’s argument on this issue is that “Count I, Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A felony” in paragraph 7(D)(ii) of his plea agreement speaks for itself. We agree that it does speak for itself—as an obvious typographical error. In the plea agreement, Anderson pleaded guilty to “Count I, . . . Dealing Cocaine as a Class B felony, and to Count II, Dealing in Cocaine, as charged as a Class A Felony . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17 (italics removed). That is, the only Class A felony he pleaded guilty to was charged under Count II, as made clear by paragraph 7(A) of his plea agreement. The plea agreement then, in paragraph 7(B), disposes of his sentence “[a]s to Count I.” Id. (italics removed).
Having disposed of that sentence, in paragraph 7(D) the agreement then proceeds to explain how the delayed sentencing “[a]s to Count II” will proceed. Id. at 18 (italics removed). In particular, that paragraph states that Anderson’s “sentencing” for “Count II” will be “as set forth below,” and subparagraphs (i) and (ii) then follow. Id. (italics removed). Those two subparagraphs operate to say, in effect, that, if Anderson were to successfully complete his suspended sentence on Count I, the State would move to dismiss Count II. “However,” if Anderson did not successfully complete the suspended sentence on Count I, “the parties [would] proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized by [law] on Count I [sic], Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A Felony.” Id.
The last reference to “Count I” does not make any sense if read literally, as Anderson urges us to do. The reference is clearly intended to be to “Count II” based on the structure of the agreement, the whole of the text, and the immediately subsequent reference to a Class A felony. And, again, our goal in the interpretation of an agreement is to give effect to the intent of the parties based on the agreement as a whole. Accordingly, we reject Anderson’s argument on this issue.
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[T]he State [also] presented sufficient evidence that Anderson committed the federal firearms offenses during his probationary period.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur