May, J.
The trial court adjudicated C.J. as a delinquent for acts that would constitute Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult. He raises one issue on appeal, which we restate and expand to two issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence collected during an interrogation of C.J. because C.J. had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights before being interrogated by a police officer, and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the true finding without considering the evidence derived from the interrogation. …
C.J., a twelve-year-old boy, lived in Indianapolis with his Mother, Stepfather, four-year-old sister A.T., and eleven-year-old brother A.J. In October 2018, A.J. walked into a bedroom and saw A.T. with her pants down and C.J.’s face close to her rear end. A.J. told Mother what he saw. Mother called a “crisis hotline” and then took the children to the hospital. Medical personnel performed a sexual assault assessment on A.T. but did not discover any signs of trauma. Hospital staff contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), and DCS contacted law enforcement. Around 3 p.m. the next day, Mother and the three children went to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department to speak with Detective Eli McAllister.
Detective McAllister escorted C.J. to a room in the police station and left him alone for approximately fifty minutes. While waiting, C.J. sprawled on the floor, curled up into his shirt, drummed on the seat of a chair, sang, and played with his sock. Eventually, Mother and Detective McAllister entered the room, and Detective McAllister acknowledged that C.J. was “tired and sleepy.” He told C.J. that it was C.J.’s decision whether to talk with him. C.J. and Detective McAllister then proceeded to talk about C.J.’s school, hobbies, chores, and bikes.
After a few minutes of informal conversation, Detective McAllister redirected the conversation to C.J.’s interactions with A.T. the night before by saying: “Hey man, I think you know why you’re here today.” Detective McAllister then proceeded to review the waiver of rights form with C.J. and Mother. …
Detective McAllister read each line of the waiver form and waited for C.J. and Mother to acknowledge that they understood. At times, C.J. interrupted Detective McAllister to talk about police television shows. … Both C.J. and Mother signed the waiver of rights form acknowledging they had read and understood the six rights listed above.
… Upon returning to the room, Detective McAllister indicated Mother informed him off camera that C.J. wanted to talk to him without Mother present, and C.J. confirmed he wanted to talk to Detective McAllister alone. … While alone in the interrogation room, C.J. hummed, moved chairs, danced, clapped, and laughed.
Detective McAllister returned and resumed the interrogation with C.J. alone. C.J. initially denied touching A.T. C.J. talked about cars, his difficulties spelling and reading, and fights with other children at his school. Over the course of the interrogation, Detective McAllister accused C.J. of lying and stated that he knew what really happened. C.J. eventually admitted touching and licking A.T.’s rear end. C.J. also acknowledged he might have touched her vagina.
C.J. was arrested and charged with acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Level 3 felony child molesting and Level 4 felony child molesting. The juvenile court held a delinquency hearing on January 3 and 4, 2019. … At the conclusion of the hearing, the State dismissed the Level 3 felony child molesting allegation, and the court entered a true finding as to the Level 4 felony. The court placed C.J. on probation and ordered placement at a behavior health services provider as a condition of probation.
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In the context of juvenile interrogations, Indiana law requires additional procedural safeguards beyond those required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1(2) governs the waiver of juvenile rights during interrogation…Regarding these requirements, our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that before a juvenile’s statements can be used in the State’s case-in-chief: First, both the juvenile and his or her parent must be adequately advised of the juvenile’s rights. Second, the juvenile must be given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his or her parent. Third, both the juvenile and his or her parent must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the juvenile’s rights. Finally, the juvenile’s statements must be voluntary and not the result ofcoercive police activity.
D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 334 … The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile received all the protections listed in Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1 and that both the juvenile and his parent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily executed the waiver.
C.J. contends he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. …
C.J. argues that “[a]s a low-functioning twelve-year-old, he did not and could not understand the nature of the rights being waived.” Mother testified C.J. had an IQ of 70. During the interrogation, C.J.’s speech was stunted, he used poor grammar, and he talked about unrelated topics, like cars and television shows. …
Even when C.J. was left alone in the interrogation room after Detective McAllister read the waiver of rights to C.J. and C.J. waived his rights, C.J. hummed, moved chairs, danced, clapped, and laughed.
Moreover, C.J. was never informed of the delinquent act of which he was suspected or of the potential consequences. After the interrogation, C.J. asked the arresting officer where he was being taken. There is no evidence C.J. recognized he was being asked about criminal activity during the interrogation. … Therefore, C.J.’s mere recognition that he would likely get into trouble does not automatically equate to an appreciation for the illegal nature of his conduct.
Detective McAllister did read all the warnings on the waiver of rights form to C.J. and Mother before asking C.J. questions. … However, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the
United States Supreme Court observed that “[i]f the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given, and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone is insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver of Miranda rights. The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.” 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). The State failed to make the additional showing required by Berghuis.
Finally, we note the de minimis consultation that occurred between C.J. and Mother. …
The brevity of the conversation between C.J. and Mother impacts whether C.J.’s waiver was knowing and intelligent because we expect people facing consequential decisions to take time to contemplate their options before making a decision.
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that C.J.’s waiver of his rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because of his demonstrated lack of maturity, the fact that he was not advised of the crime and possible consequences, and his minimal consultation with Mother. Therefore, we hold the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the videotape of C.J.’s interrogation and Detective McAllister’s testimony regarding C.J.’s statements during the interrogation. See Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 2001) …
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C.J.’s waiver was not valid because the totality of the circumstances demonstrates he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily join the waiver. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the information gathered during that interrogation, and we reverse C.J.’s adjudication as a delinquent because the record contains no evidence to support it.
Reversed.
Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.